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An Experimental Investigation Of Cooperation In The Dynamic Common Pool Game

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  • Emanuel Vespa

Abstract

This article studies experimentally to what extent subjects can cooperate in a dynamic common pool game, where the stage game changes endogenously. Although efficiency can be supported with strategies that condition on history, the main finding is that it is difficult to cooperate. Even if the incentives to cooperate are large, modal behavior can be rationalized with equilibrium Markov strategies that do not condition on history. The popularity of Markov strategies, however, is decreasing in the incentives to cooperate. The evidence also suggests that strategic uncertainty added by facing stage games that change in time may move play away from efficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Emanuel Vespa, 2020. "An Experimental Investigation Of Cooperation In The Dynamic Common Pool Game," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 61(1), pages 417-440, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:61:y:2020:i:1:p:417-440
    DOI: 10.1111/iere.12428
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Tobias Salz & Emanuel Vespa, 2020. "Estimating dynamic games of oligopolistic competition: an experimental investigation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(2), pages 447-469, June.
    2. Boczoń, Marta & Vespa, Emanuel & Weidman, Taylor & Wilson, Alistair J, 2024. "Testing Models of Strategic Uncertainty: Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt7pk7c4gb, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    3. Anujit Chakraborty, 2022. "Motives Behind Cooperation in Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," Working Papers 353, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    4. M. Djiguemde & D. Dubois & A. Sauquet & M. Tidball, 2022. "Continuous Versus Discrete Time in Dynamic Common Pool Resource Game Experiments," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 82(4), pages 985-1014, August.
    5. Michela Boldrini & Valentina Bosetti & Salvatore Nunnari, 2024. "Negative Emission Technologies and Climate Cooperation," CESifo Working Paper Series 10905, CESifo.
    6. Emanuel Vespa & Taylor Weidman & Alistair J. Wilson, 2021. "Testing Models of Strategic Uncertainty: Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games," Papers 2101.05900, arXiv.org.
    7. Pevnitskaya, Svetlana & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2022. "The effect of access to clean technology on pollution reduction: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 117-141.
    8. Heller, Yuval & Tubul, Itay, 2023. "Strategies in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma: A cluster analysis," MPRA Paper 117444, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Chakraborty, Anujit, 2023. "Motives behind cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 105-132.
    10. Tetsuya Kawamura & Tiffany Tsz Kwan Tse, 2022. "Intelligence promotes cooperation in long-term interaction: experimental evidence in infinitely repeated public goods games," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 17(4), pages 927-946, October.

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