A Note on Best Response Dynamics
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- Hopkins, Ed, 1999. "A Note on Best Response Dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 138-150, October.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
games; learning; evolution; mixed strategies;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EVO-2017-06-25 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2017-06-25 (Game Theory)
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