Coordination with Differential Time Preferences: Experimental Evidence
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More about this item
Keywords
Repeated Games; Discounting; Intertemporal Trade; Experiments;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D15 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Intertemporal Household Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving
- D25 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice: Investment, Capacity, and Financing
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EXP-2023-12-18 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2023-12-18 (Game Theory)
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