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New Directions for Modelling Strategic Behavior: Game-Theoretic Models of Communication, Coordination, and Cooperation in Economic Relationships

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  • Crawford, Vincent P

Abstract

In this paper, I discuss the state of progress in applications of game theory in economics and try to identify possible future developments that are likely to yield further progress. To keep the topic manageable, I focus on a canonical economic problem that is inherently game-theoretic, that of fostering efficient coordination and cooperation in relationships, with particular attention to the role of communication. I begin with an overview of noncooperative game theory's principal model of behavior, Nash equilibrium. I next discuss the alternative “thinking” and “learning” rationales for how real-world actors might reach equilibrium decisions. I then review how Nash equilibrium has been used to model coordination, communication, and cooperation in relationships, and discuss possible developments

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  • Crawford, Vincent P, 2016. "New Directions for Modelling Strategic Behavior: Game-Theoretic Models of Communication, Coordination, and Cooperation in Economic Relationships," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt94x5t6vn, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:qt94x5t6vn
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    Cited by:

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    3. Ellingsen, Tore & Östling, Robert & Wengström, Erik, 2018. "How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 153-181.
    4. Marina Agranov & Jeongbin Kim & Leeat Yariv, 2023. "Coordination with Differential Time Preferences: Experimental Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 10454, CESifo.
    5. Brian H Spitzberg, 2018. "Framing the Game: An Architectonic Analogue for Meta-Theorizing Academic Activities," Studies in Media and Communication, Redfame publishing, vol. 6(1), pages 11-25, June.
    6. Christopher Roby, 2021. "Can loss framing improve coordination in the minimum effort game?," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 16(3), pages 557-588, July.
    7. Daniel Kiprotich Kiprop & Sr. Dr. Lucy Wanza & Mr. Robert Githinji, 2023. "Relationship Between Cost Leadership Strategies and Performance of Domestic Airline Firms in Kenya," International Journal of Research and Scientific Innovation, International Journal of Research and Scientific Innovation (IJRSI), vol. 10(8), pages 38-52, August.
    8. Kim, Duk Gyoo & Kim, Hee Chun, 2022. "Probability matching and strategic decision making," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    9. Marina Agranov & Jeongbin Kim & Leeat Yariv, 2023. "Coordination with Differential Time Preferences: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 2023-10, Princeton University. Economics Department..

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economics; Applied Economics; Economic Theory; Basic Behavioral and Social Science; Behavioral and Social Science; Applied economics; Econometrics; Economic theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

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