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The Effect of Repeated Play on Reputation Building: An Experimental Approach

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  • Tingley, Dustin H.
  • Walter, Barbara F.

Abstract

What effect does repeated play have on reputation building? The literature on international relations remains divided on whether, when, and how reputation matters in both interstate and intrastate conflict. We examine reputation building through a series of incentivized laboratory experiments. Using comparative statics from a repeated entry-deterrence game, we isolate how incentives for reputation building should change as the number of entrants changes. We find that subjects in our experiments generally build reputations and that those investments pay off, but we also find that some subjects did not react to incentives to build reputation in ways our model had predicted. In order to explain this, we focus on the heterogeneity of preferences and cognitive abilities that may exist in any population. Our research suggests that rational-choice scholars of international relations and those using more psychologically based explanations have more common ground than previously articulated.

Suggested Citation

  • Tingley, Dustin H. & Walter, Barbara F., 2011. "The Effect of Repeated Play on Reputation Building: An Experimental Approach," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 65(2), pages 343-365, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:65:y:2011:i:02:p:343-365_00
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jonathan A. Chu, 2019. "A Clash of Norms? How Reciprocity and International Humanitarian Law affect American Opinion on the Treatment of POWs," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 63(5), pages 1140-1164, May.
    2. Brandon K. Yoder & Kyle Haynes, 2021. "Signaling under the Security Dilemma: An Experimental Analysis," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 65(4), pages 672-700, April.
    3. Javier Leonardo Garay Vargas & Juan Bautista Pavajeau, 2021. "Ideas erradas, acciones equivocadas : cómo el contexto internacional impide la generación de desarrollo," Books, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Facultad de Finanzas, Gobierno y Relaciones Internacionales, number 151, April.
    4. Todd S. Sechser, 2018. "Reputations and Signaling in Coercive Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 62(2), pages 318-345, February.
    5. Marina Agranov & Jeongbin Kim & Leeat Yariv, 2023. "Coordination with Differential Time Preferences: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 2023-10, Princeton University. Economics Department..
    6. Keren Yarhi-Milo & Joshua D. Kertzer & Jonathan Renshon, 2018. "Tying Hands, Sinking Costs, and Leader Attributes," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 62(10), pages 2150-2179, November.
    7. Allan Dafoe & Remco Zwetsloot & Matthew Cebul, 2021. "Reputations for Resolve and Higher-Order Beliefs in Crisis Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 65(7-8), pages 1378-1404, August.
    8. Marina Agranov & Jeongbin Kim & Leeat Yariv, 2023. "Coordination with Differential Time Preferences: Experimental Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 10454, CESifo.
    9. Caleb Cox & Matthew Jones & Kevin Pflum & Paul Healy, 2015. "Revealed reputations in the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(3), pages 441-484, April.

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