How to apply penalties to avoid delays in projects
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- Bergantiños, Gustavo & Lorenzo, Leticia, 2019. "How to apply penalties to avoid delays in projects," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 275(2), pages 608-620.
- Bergantiños, Gustavo & Lorenzo, Leticia, 2019. "How to apply penalties to avoid delays in projects," MPRA Paper 97139, University Library of Munich, Germany.
References listed on IDEAS
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- J. C. Gonçalves-Dosantos & I. García-Jurado & J. Costa, 2020. "Sharing delay costs in stochastic scheduling problems with delays," 4OR, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 457-476, December.
- Šůcha, Přemysl & Agnetis, Alessandro & Šidlovský, Marko & Briand, Cyril, 2021. "Nash equilibrium solutions in multi-agent project scheduling with milestones," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 294(1), pages 29-41.
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More about this item
Keywords
game theory; PERT; delays; penalties;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BEC-2019-02-11 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CFN-2019-02-11 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-CTA-2019-02-11 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2019-02-11 (Game Theory)
- NEP-PPM-2019-02-11 (Project, Program and Portfolio Management)
- NEP-UPT-2019-02-11 (Utility Models and Prospect Theory)
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