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Noncooperative justifications for old bankruptcy rules

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  • José M. Jiménez Gómez

    (Universidad Politécnica de Cartagena)

Abstract

In this paper we use two different sets of Commonly Accepted Equity Principles to provide new characterizations of well known bankruptcy rules from an strategic viewpoint. In this sense, we extend the results obtained by Chun, 1989, and Herrero, 2003, who followed the van Damme's approach, 1986, for solving Nash type bargaining problems, but in bankruptcy problems. Specifially, by using, on the one hand, the Unanimous Concessions mechanism we justify Piniles' and the Constrained Egalitarian rules, and, on the other hand, with the Diminishing Claims procedure we retrieve the Dual of Pinile's and the Dual of Constrained Egalitarian rules.

Suggested Citation

  • José M. Jiménez Gómez, 2010. "Noncooperative justifications for old bankruptcy rules," Working Papers. Serie AD 2010-15, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    • Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2010-15
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bankruptcy problems; strategic approach; noncooperative justifications; Piniles¿ rule; Constrained Egalitarian rule.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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