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Monotonic Incompatibility Between Electing and Ranking

Author

Listed:
  • Michel L. Balinski

    (X-DEP-ECO - Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris)

  • Andrew Jennings

    (Department of Mathematics and Statistics - ASU - Arizona State University [Tempe])

  • Rida Laraki

    (X-DEP-ECO - Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris)

Abstract

Borda proposed a method that assigns points to each of the m candidates. Condorcet proposed a method that assigns points to each of the m! rankings of candidates. The first is more appropriate for electing, the second is more appropriate for ranking. Each satisfies a different type of monotonicity. These monotonicities are incompatible.

Suggested Citation

  • Michel L. Balinski & Andrew Jennings & Rida Laraki, 2008. "Monotonic Incompatibility Between Electing and Ranking," Working Papers hal-00339030, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00339030
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00339030
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
    2. Muller, Eitan & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1977. "The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 412-418, April.
    3. Michel L. Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2006. "A Theory of Measuring, Electing and Ranking," Working Papers hal-00243040, HAL.
    4. Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-1041, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Roy, Sunanda & Wu, Kuan Chuen & Chandra, Abhijit, 2015. "Uncovering the "Will of the People": Measuring Preference Polarization among Voters," Staff General Research Papers Archive 38358, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    2. repec:dau:papers:123456789/15122 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2014. "Judge: Don't Vote !," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 62(3), pages 483-511, June.
    4. Roy, Sunanda & Wu, Kuan Chuen & Chandra, Abhijit, 2014. "Uncovering the "Will of the People": Heterogeneity and Polarization within electorates," Staff General Research Papers Archive 37330, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    5. Abhijit Chandra & Sunanda Roy, 2013. "On removing Condorcet effects from pairwise election tallies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(4), pages 1143-1158, April.

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