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The effects of the three-point rule in individual sports: Evidence from chess

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Listed:
  • Parinduri, Rasyad
  • Lee, Yoong Hon
  • Tiong, Kung Ming

Abstract

We examine the effects of the three-point rule in individual sports. We consider chess in which most tournaments use the standard rule while some tournaments use the Bilbao rule, which is identical to the three-point rule in soccer: We observe the same pairs of chess players playing under both rules, a research design that fits fixed-effect models. We find the Bilbao rule makes games 33 percent more decisive, mostly to white players’ advantage who win 50 percent more games. We identify two mechanisms why the Bilbao rule works: It encourages players to play longer and discourages them from using drawish openings. These results suggest incentive schemes like the three-point rule work in individual sports in which efforts and financial rewards are directly linked and game dynamics and strategic interactions among teammates and with opponents are less complex.

Suggested Citation

  • Parinduri, Rasyad & Lee, Yoong Hon & Tiong, Kung Ming, 2016. "The effects of the three-point rule in individual sports: Evidence from chess," MPRA Paper 71060, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:71060
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    scoring systems; three-point rule; individual sports; chess; fixed effects model;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism

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