IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/70748.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Transboundary Renewable Resource Management and Conservation Motives

Author

Listed:
  • Missios, Paul
  • Plourde, Charles

Abstract

A simple, two-country theoretical model of transboundary fishing conflicts in which one country has a nonlucrative incentive to conserve the fish stock is presented to examine the effect of such a conservation motive on the steady state stock level and to analyze how this stock level is affected by the division of the harvest. It is demonstrated that a conservation motive for one or both countries serves to increase the stock level and that this level is dependent on the harvest share of the country with the motive. A brief application to the Canada-European Union turbot and Canada-United States salmon disputes suggests consistency between the principles of the model and reality.

Suggested Citation

  • Missios, Paul & Plourde, Charles, 1997. "Transboundary Renewable Resource Management and Conservation Motives," MPRA Paper 70748, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:70748
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/70748/1/MPRA_paper_70748.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jon Vislie, 1987. "On the Optimal Management of Transboundary Renewable Resources: A Comment," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 20(4), pages 870-875, November.
    2. David Levhari & Leonard J. Mirman, 1980. "The Great Fish War: An Example Using a Dynamic Cournot-Nash Solution," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 322-334, Spring.
    3. Gordon R. Munro, 1979. "The Optimal Management of Transboundary Renewable Resources," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 12(3), pages 355-376, August.
    4. Paul C. Missios & Charles Plourde, 1996. "The Canada-European Union Turbot War: A Brief Game Theoretic Analysis," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 22(2), pages 144-150, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hassan Benchekroun & Ngo Van Long, 2001. "Leader and Follower: A Differential Game Model," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-08, CIRANO.
    2. Ferrara, Ida & Missios, Paul C., 1998. "Non-use values and the management of transboundary renewable resources," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 281-289, June.
    3. Pintassilgo, Pedro & Laukkanen, Marita & Kronbak, Lone Grønbæk & Lindroos, Marko, 2015. "International Fisheries Agreements and Non-consumptive Values," Discussion Papers on Economics 8/2015, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics.
    4. List, John A. & Mason, Charles F., 2001. "Optimal Institutional Arrangements for Transboundary Pollutants in a Second-Best World: Evidence from a Differential Game with Asymmetric Players," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 277-296, November.
    5. Costello, Christopher & Polasky, Stephen, 2008. "Optimal harvesting of stochastic spatial resources," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 1-18, July.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Florian K. Diekert & Emmi Nieminen, 2017. "International Fisheries Agreements with a Shifting Stock," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 185-211, June.
    2. TAKARADA Yasuhiro, 2009. "Transboundary Renewable Resource and International Trade," Discussion papers 09041, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    3. Breton, Michèle & Keoula, Michel Yevenunye, 2014. "A great fish war model with asymmetric players," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 209-223.
    4. Manuel Pacheco Coelho & José António Filipe, 2021. "Searching for a New Model of Governance in the High Seas: Game Theory Applied to International Commons Management," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(19), pages 1-28, October.
    5. Ferrara, Ida & Missios, Paul C., 1998. "Non-use values and the management of transboundary renewable resources," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 281-289, June.
    6. Gardner Brown, 2000. "Renewable Natural Resource Management and Use Without Markets," Working Papers 0025, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
    7. K. Erdlenbruch & M. Tidball, 2006. "Singular Optimal Control Model of Stock-Dependent Environmental Policies," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 69-88, October.
    8. José António Filipe & Manuel Alberto M. Ferreira & Manuel Coelho & Maria Isabel Pedro, 2012. "Cooperation on Stocks Recover," International Journal of Finance, Insurance and Risk Management, International Journal of Finance, Insurance and Risk Management, vol. 2(1), pages 1-74.
    9. Hassan Benchekroun & Ngo Van Long, 2001. "Leader and Follower: A Differential Game Model," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-08, CIRANO.
    10. Selles Jules & Bonhommeau Sylvain & Guillotreau Patrice & Vallée Thomas, 2020. "Can the Threat of Economic Sanctions Ensure the Sustainability of International Fisheries? An Experiment of a Dynamic Non-cooperative CPR Game with Uncertain Tipping Point," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 76(1), pages 153-176, May.
    11. McWhinnie, Stephanie F., 2009. "The tragedy of the commons in international fisheries: An empirical examination," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 321-333, May.
    12. Bjorndal, Trond, 1992. "Management of Fisheries as a Common Property Resource," 1991 Conference, August 22-29, 1991, Tokyo, Japan 183365, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    13. Kaffine Daniel T & Costello Christopher, 2011. "Unitization of Spatially Connected Renewable Resources," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-31, March.
    14. Richard Horan & James Shortle & Erwin Bulte, 1999. "Renewable Resource Policy When Distributional Impacts Matter," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 14(2), pages 191-215, September.
    15. Marita Laukkanen, 2003. "Transboundary Fisheries Management under Implementation Uncertainty," Working Papers 2003.118, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    16. Ben White, 2000. "A Review of the Economics of Biological Natural Resources," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 419-462, September.
    17. Lone Grønbæk, 2000. "Fishery Economics and Game Theory," Working Papers 14/00, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics.
    18. Gardner M. Brown, 2000. "Renewable Natural Resource Management and Use without Markets," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(4), pages 875-914, December.
    19. Kuzyutin, Denis & Smirnova, Nadezhda, 2023. "A dynamic multicriteria game of renewable resource extraction with environmentally concerned players," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
    20. Guillaume Bataille & Benteng Zou, 2024. "International Fisheries Agreements: Endogenous Exits, Shapley Values, and Moratorium Fishing Policy," AMSE Working Papers 2421, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Conservation; natural resource management; game theory; optimal control theory; fisheries managment; turbot; salmon; renewable resources;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:70748. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.