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Non-use values and the management of transboundary renewable resources

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  • Ferrara, Ida
  • Missios, Paul C.

Abstract

It has long been recognized in economics that individuals can derive benefits from a resource stock without directly or indirectly utilizing that resource. Such non-use values, including existence values and bequest values, however, are often ignored in models of resource management. In this paper, a simple, two-country model of the management of a renewable resource is developed in which at least one country has a non-economic interest in the conservation of the fish stock to examine the impact of such a non-use value on the end-of-period harvest and self-enforcing sharing rule. The model shows that this non-lucrative pursuit serves to decrease the total allowable catch for each period at the expense of the catch share of the more conservation-oriented country, a result is consistent with the September 1995 decision by NAFO ending the dispute between Canada and the European Union over turbot.
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Suggested Citation

  • Ferrara, Ida & Missios, Paul C., 1998. "Non-use values and the management of transboundary renewable resources," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 281-289, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:25:y:1998:i:3:p:281-289
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    2. Richard C. Bishop & Michael P. Welsh, 1992. "Existence Values in Benefit-Cost Analysis and Damage Assessment," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 68(4), pages 405-417.
    3. Ida, Ferrara & Paul, Missios, 1996. "Transboundary Renewable Resource Management: A Dynamic Game with Differing Non-Cooperative Payoffs," MPRA Paper 70749, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Missios, Paul & Plourde, Charles, 1997. "Transboundary Renewable Resource Management and Conservation Motives," MPRA Paper 70748, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Jon Vislie, 1987. "On the Optimal Management of Transboundary Renewable Resources: A Comment," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 20(4), pages 870-875, November.
    6. David Levhari & Leonard J. Mirman, 1980. "The Great Fish War: An Example Using a Dynamic Cournot-Nash Solution," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 322-334, Spring.
    7. Gordon R. Munro, 1979. "The Optimal Management of Transboundary Renewable Resources," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 12(3), pages 355-376, August.
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    Cited by:

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    3. Hajkowicz, Stefan, 2006. "Multi-attributed environmental index construction," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 122-139, April.
    4. Pintassilgo, Pedro & Laukkanen, Marita & Kronbak, Lone Grønbæk & Lindroos, Marko, 2015. "International Fisheries Agreements and Non-consumptive Values," Discussion Papers on Economics 8/2015, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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