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Searching for a New Model of Governance in the High Seas: Game Theory Applied to International Commons Management

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  • Manuel Pacheco Coelho

    (Department of Economics, Lisbon School of Economics & Management, University of Lisbon, SOCIUS/ISEG, 1249-078 Lisboa, Portugal)

  • José António Filipe

    (Departamento de Matemática, ISCTE/Instituto Universitário de Lisboa, ISTAR-Iscte, BRU-Iscte, 1649-026 Lisboa, Portugal)

Abstract

In the last decade, the United Nations took important steps for the creation of a new instrument for biodiversity protection in areas beyond national jurisdiction. This put under discussion the central issues of international commons management and of the governance model for the High Seas. The aim of this paper is to discuss and evaluate critically the political negotiations already made and yet to come, as well as their rationale. For this purpose, the paper applies game theory to fisheries management to get insights. This research aims to contribute toward more qualified and grounded decisions. The key role of cooperation in the sustainable use of common resources is stressed.

Suggested Citation

  • Manuel Pacheco Coelho & José António Filipe, 2021. "Searching for a New Model of Governance in the High Seas: Game Theory Applied to International Commons Management," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(19), pages 1-28, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:9:y:2021:i:19:p:2516-:d:651255
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