Indirect Policing: Its Theory, Mechanism, and Application to Combatting Elusive Perpetrators
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More about this item
Keywords
cracker; deterrence; indirect policing; piracy; terrorism; vicarious sanction.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
- F52 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - National Security; Economic Nationalism
- F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
- H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
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