Secessionism and Minority Protection in an Uncertain World
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Anesi, Vincent, 2012. "Secessionism and minority protection in an uncertain world," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 53-61.
References listed on IDEAS
- Alberto Alesina & Enrico Spolaore, 1997.
"On the Number and Size of Nations,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1027-1056.
- Alberto Alesina & Enrico Spolaore, 1995. "On the Number and Size of Nations," NBER Working Papers 5050, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ramey, Garey, 1996. "D1 Signaling Equilibria with Multiple Signals and a Continuum of Types," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 508-531, May.
- Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, 2009. "Over My Dead Body: Bargaining and the Price of Dignity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(2), pages 459-465, May.
- Enrico Spolaore & Alberto Alesina & Romain Wacziarg, 2000.
"Economic Integration and Political Disintegration,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1276-1296, December.
- Alberto Alesina & Enrico Spolaore & Romain Wacziarg, 1997. "Economic Integration and Political Disintegration," NBER Working Papers 6163, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Wacziarg, Romain & Spolaore, Enrico & Alesina, Alberto, 2000. "Economic Integration and Political Disintegration," Scholarly Articles 4553029, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2001.
"A Theory of Political Transitions,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 938-963, September.
- Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James A, 1999. "A Theory of Political Transitions," CEPR Discussion Papers 2277, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson, 1999. "A Theory of Political Transitions," Working papers 99-26, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2000.
"Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(4), pages 1167-1199.
- Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J., 1997. "Why Did West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Ineqiality and Growth in Historical Perspective," Working papers 97-23, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James A, 1998. "Why did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality and Growth in Historical Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 1797, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gradstein, Mark, 2004. "Political Bargaining in a Federation: Buchanan meets Coase," CEPR Discussion Papers 4188, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ben D. MacArthur & Richard O. C. Oreffo, 2005. "Bridging the gap," Nature, Nature, vol. 433(7021), pages 19-19, January.
- Haimanko, Ori & Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 2005.
"Transfers in a polarized country: bridging the gap between efficiency and stability,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(7), pages 1277-1303, July.
- HAIMANKO, Ori & LE BRETON, Michel & WEBER, Shlomo, 2002. "Transfers in a polarized country: bridging the gap between efficiency and stability," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2002018, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- HAIMANKO, Ori & E BRETON, Michel & WEBER, Shlomo, 2005. "Transfers in a polarized country: bridging the gap between efficiency and stability," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1774, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Haimanko, Ori & Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 2003. "Transfers in a Polarized Country : Bridging the Gap between Efficiency and Stability," IDEI Working Papers 208, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Michel Le Breton & Shlomo Weber, 2003.
"The Art of Making Everybody Happy: How to Prevent a Secession,"
IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 50(3), pages 1-4.
- LE BRETON, Michel & WEBER, Shlomo, 2001. "The art of making everybody happy: how to prevent a secession," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2001011, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 2003. "The Art of Making Everybody Happy : How to Prevent a Secession," IDEI Working Papers 164, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987.
"Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
- In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1997. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 896, David K. Levine.
- Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999.
"A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., . "A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation," Chapters in Economics,, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, "undated". "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers 004, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1999. "A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation," Munich Reprints in Economics 20650, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1998. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers 1812, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gradstein, Mark, 2004. "Political bargaining in a federation: Buchanan meets Coase," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(5), pages 983-999, October.
- Patrick Bolton & Gérard Roland, 1997.
"The Breakup of Nations: A Political Economy Analysis,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1057-1090.
- Bolton, Patrick & Roland, Gérard, 1995. "The Break up of Nations: A Political Economy Analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers 1225, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, December.
- Massimo Morelli & Dominic Rohner, 2010.
"Natural resource distribution and multiple forms of civil war,"
IEW - Working Papers
498, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Massimo Morelli & Dominic Rohner, 2010. "Natural Resource Distribution and Multiple Forms of Civil War," OxCarre Working Papers 050, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford.
- Massimo Morelli & Dominic Rohner, 2010. "Natural Resource Distribution and Multiple Forms of Civil War," HiCN Working Papers 80, Households in Conflict Network.
- Massimo Morelli & Dominic Rohner, 2010. "Natural Resource Distribution and Multiple Forms of Civil War," Economics Working Papers ECO2010/33, European University Institute.
- Anders Olofsgârd, 2004. "Secessions and Political Extremism: Why Regional Referenda Do Not Solve the Problem," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(5), pages 805-832, September.
- Torsten Persson & Gérard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 1997.
"Separation of Powers and Political Accountability,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1163-1202.
- Torsten Persson & Gerard Roland & Guido Tabellini, "undated". "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," Working Papers 100, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Torsten Persson & Gerard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 1997. "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," CESifo Working Paper Series 136, CESifo.
- Walter, Barbara F., 2006. "Information, Uncertainty, and the Decision to Secede," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(1), pages 105-135, January.
- Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 379-414, July.
- Lustick, Ian S. & Miodownik, Dan & Eidelson, Roy J., 2004. "Secessionism in Multicultural States: Does Sharing Power Prevent or Encourage It?," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 98(2), pages 209-229, May.
- Robert Young, 2004. "Secession as Revolution," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 21, pages 373-395.
- Powell, Robert, 2004. "The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 98(2), pages 231-241, May.
- Buchanan, James M & Faith, Roger L, 1987. "Secession and the Limits of Taxation: Toward a Theory of Internal Exit," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 1023-1031, December.
- Hale, Henry E., 2000. "The Parade of Sovereignties: Testing Theories of Secession in the Soviet Setting," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 30(1), pages 31-56, January.
- James D. Fearon, 2004. "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 41(3), pages 275-301, May.
- Olofsgard, Anders, 2003. "Incentives for secession in the presence of mobile ethnic groups," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(9-10), pages 2105-2128, September.
- Slantchev, Branislav L., 2003. "The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 97(4), pages 621-632, November.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Lacroix, Jean & Mitchener, Kris & Oosterlinck, Kim, 2023.
"Domino Secessions: Evidence from the U.S,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
18377, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jean Lacroix & Kris James Mitchener & Kim Oosterlinck, 2023. "Domino Secessions: Evidence from the U.S," NBER Working Papers 31589, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jean Lacroix & Kris Mitchener & Kim Oosterlinck, 2023. "Domino Secessions: Evidence from the US," Working Papers hal-04210430, HAL.
- Lacroix, Jean & Mitchener, Kris James & Oosterlinck, Kim, 2023. "Domino Secessions: Evidence from the U.S," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 676, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
- Ehrke, Jürgen, 2012. "How to assist separatists in breaking up a country... or, rather, not: The role of decentralization and development assistance," MPRA Paper 44045, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Martijn Huysmans & Christophe Crombez, 2020. "Making exit costly but efficient: the political economy of exit clauses and secession," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 89-110, March.
- Alexander Libman, 2015. "Words or deeds: what matters? On the role of symbolic action in political decentralization," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 801-838, November.
- Enriqueta Aragonès & Clara PonsatÃ, 2021. "The stability of multi-level governments," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(1), pages 140-166, January.
- Rhea Molato, 2015. "Public Debt and the Threat of Secession," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2015-04, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Anesi, Vincent, 2012.
"Secessionism and minority protection in an uncertain world,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 53-61.
- Vincent Anesi, 2010. "Secessionism and Minority Protection in an Uncertain World," Discussion Papers 2010-15, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Vincent Anesi, 2010. "Secessionism and Minority Protection in an Uncertain World," Discussion Papers 2010-15, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Vincent Anesi & Philippe De Donder, 2011.
"Voting under the Threat of Secession: Accommodation vs. Repression,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
3458, CESifo Group Munich.
- Vincent Anesi & Philippe De Donder, 2011. "Voting under the threat of secession: accommodation vs. repression," Working Papers 2011/40, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
- Libman, Alexander Mikhailovich, 2009. "Эндогенные Границы И Распределение Власти В Федерациях И Международных Сообществах [ENDOGENOUS BOUNDARIES AND DISTRIBUTION OF POWER In the Federation]," MPRA Paper 16473, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Vincent Anesi & Philippe De Donder, 2011.
"Voting under the Threat of Secession: Accommodation vs. Repression,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
3458, CESifo.
- Vincent Anesi & Philippe De Donder, 2011. "Voting under the threat of secession: accommodation vs. repression," Working Papers 2011/40, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
- Rohner, Dominic & Esteban, Joan & Flamand, Sabine & Morelli, Massimo, 2018.
"A Dynamic Theory of Secession,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
12398, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Joan Esteban & Sabine Flamand & Massimo Morelli & Dominic Rohner, 2018. "A Dynamic Theory of Secession," HiCN Working Papers 276, Households in Conflict Network.
- Joan Esteban & Sabine Flamand & Massimo Morelli & Dominic Rohner, 2018. "A Dynamic Theory of Secession," CESifo Working Paper Series 7257, CESifo.
- Thierry Madiès & Grégoire Rota-Grasiozi & Jean-Pierre Tranchant & Cyril Trépier, 2018.
"The economics of secession: a review of legal, theoretical, and empirical aspects,"
Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, Springer;Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics, vol. 154(1), pages 1-18, December.
- Thierry Madiès & Grégoire Rota-Graziosi & Jean-Pierre Tranchant & Cyril Trépier, 2018. "The economics of secession: a review of legal, theoretical, and empirical aspects," Post-Print hal-01816827, HAL.
- Flamand, Sabine, 2019. "Partial decentralization as a way to prevent secessionist conflict," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 159-178.
- Joan-Maria Esteban & Sabine Flamand & Massimo Morelli & Dominic Rohner, 2018. "The Survival and Demise of the State: A Dynamic Theory of Secession," Working Papers 1028, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Ernesto Dal Bó & Robert Powell, 2009. "A Model of Spoils Politics," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(1), pages 207-222, January.
- Andrés Rodríguez-Pose & Marko Stermšek, 2014.
"The economics of secession. Analysing the economic impact of the collapse of the former Yugoslavia,"
Working Papers. Collection A: Public economics, governance and decentralization
1408, Universidade de Vigo, GEN - Governance and Economics research Network.
- RodrÃguez-Pose, Andrés & StermÅ¡ek, Marko, 2014. "The Economics of Secession ? Analysing the economic impact of the collapse of the former Yugoslavia," CEPR Discussion Papers 10134, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Rhea Molato, 2015. "Public Debt and the Threat of Secession," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2015-04, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
- Vanschoonbeek, Jakob, 2020. "Divided We Stad: a Fiscal Bargaining Model for Divided Countries," MPRA Paper 101863, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Alexander Libman, 2012. "Sub-national political regimes and asymmetric fiscal decentralization," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(4), pages 302-336, December.
- Joan Esteban & Sabine Flamand & Massimo Morelli & Dominic Rohner, 2017. "Stay, Split or Strike: Theory and Evidence on Secessionist vs Centrist Conflict," Working Papers 609, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Suesse, Marvin, 2019. "Adjusting the size of nations: Empirical determinants of separatism and the Soviet breakup," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 50-64.
- Alexander Libman, 2015. "Words or deeds: what matters? On the role of symbolic action in political decentralization," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 801-838, November.
- Klaus Abbink & Jordi Brandts, 2016.
"Political autonomy and independence: Theory and experimental evidence,"
Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 28(3), pages 461-496, July.
- Klaus Abbink & Jordi Brandts, 2007. "Political Autonomy and Independence: Theory and Experimental Evidence," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 689.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Klaus Abbink & Jordi Brandts, 2009. "Political autonomy and independence: Theory and experimental evidence," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 09-12, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Klaus Abbink & Jordi Brandts, 2007. "Political Autonomy and Independence: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 302, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Klaus Abbink & Jordi Brandts, 2007. "Political Autonomy and Independence: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 013, University of Siena.
- Filippo Gregorini, 2007. "Political Geography and Income Inequalities," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Teoria Economica e Metodi Quantitativi itemq0746, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
- Enrico Spolaore, 2016.
"The economics of political borders,"
Chapters, in: Eugene Kontorovich & Francesco Parisi (ed.), Economic Analysis of International Law, chapter 1, pages 11-43,
Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Enrico Spolaore, 2012. "The Economics of Political Borders," CESifo Working Paper Series 3854, CESifo.
- Enrico Spolaore, 2012. "The Economics of Political Borders," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0767, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
- Martijn Huysmans & Christophe Crombez, 2020. "Making exit costly but efficient: the political economy of exit clauses and secession," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 89-110, March.
More about this item
Keywords
Constitutional commitment; secession; signaling; regional redistribution;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:not:notcdx:2010-15. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Jose V Guinot Saporta (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cdnotuk.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.