Tacit Collusion in Repeated Contests with Noise
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More about this item
Keywords
Contest; Conflict; Collusion; Noise;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2015-07-25 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-GTH-2015-07-25 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2015-07-25 (History and Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2015-07-25 (Microeconomics)
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