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Cooperative Rent-Seeking

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  • Linster, Bruce G

Abstract

This paper presents an analysis of cooperation in the context of a repeated rent-seeking game that can be thought of as modeling bilateral situations such as military/political conflict, labor/business lobbying, gang/illegal activities, or criminal/civil law suits. The potential for mutually advantageous agreements is explored using the repeated nature of the game as the mechanism that sustains the cooperation. The Nash bargaining solution is applied to symmetric as well as asymmetric rent-seeking situations. The asymmetries can derive from the players valuing the rent differently or choosing sequentially. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Linster, Bruce G, 1994. "Cooperative Rent-Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 81(1-2), pages 23-34, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:81:y:1994:i:1-2:p:23-34
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    Cited by:

    1. Kimbrough, Erik O. & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2013. "Side-payments and the costs of conflict," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 278-286.
    2. Antsygina, Anastasia & Kurmangaliyeva, Madina, 2022. "Settlements under unequal access to justice," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 193(C), pages 237-268.
    3. Skaperdas, Stergios & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 1998. "Complementarity in contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 667-684, November.
    4. Sebagh Thierry, 1995. "Recherche De Rente : Jeu de Guerre et Guerre D'enjeux - II," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2-3), pages 301-320, June.
    5. Dijkstra, Bouwe R., 1998. "A two-stage rent-seeking contest for instrument choice and revenue division, applied to environmental policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 281-301, May.
    6. Raouf Boucekkine & Fabien Prieur & Klarizze Puzon, 2014. "The Dynamics of Lobbying Under Uncertainty: On Political Liberalization in Arab Countries," Dynamic Modeling and Econometrics in Economics and Finance, in: Josef Haunschmied & Vladimir M. Veliov & Stefan Wrzaczek (ed.), Dynamic Games in Economics, edition 127, pages 69-87, Springer.
    7. James W. Boudreau & Shane Sanders & Nicholas Shunda, 2019. "The role of noise in alliance formation and collusion in conflicts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(3), pages 249-266, June.
    8. Liston-Heyes, Catherine, 2001. "Setting the Stakes in Environmental Contests," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 1-12, January.
    9. Erik O. Kimbrough & Roman Sheremeta, 2010. "Make Him an Offer He Can’t Refuse: Avoiding Conflicts through Side Payments," Working Papers 10-23, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    10. Boudreau, James W. & Shunda, Nicholas, 2015. "Tacit Collusion in Repeated Contests with Noise," MPRA Paper 65671, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Janmaat, Johannus A., 2007. "Stakeholder Engagement in Land Development Decisions: A Waste of Effort?," MPRA Paper 6147, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Tatiana Zhuravleva, 2013. "Corruption Measurement: the case of Russian Federation," Working Papers 0068, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, revised 2013.

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