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Giving a Second Chance to a Disadvantaged Player Resolves the Prisoner’s Dilemma

Author

Listed:
  • Nakajima, Tetsuya

Abstract

This note examines how the second chance, when provided to a disadvantaged player, can resolve the prisoner’s dilemma.

Suggested Citation

  • Nakajima, Tetsuya, 2014. "Giving a Second Chance to a Disadvantaged Player Resolves the Prisoner’s Dilemma," MPRA Paper 59937, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:59937
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/60112/1/MPRA_paper_60112.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
    2. Wagner, R. Harrison, 1983. "The Theory of Games and the Problem of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(2), pages 330-346, June.
    3. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
    4. Kalai, Ehud, 1981. "Preplay negotiations and the prisoner's dilemma," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 375-379, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Prisoner’s dilemma; Noncooperative game; Second chance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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