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The Theory of Games and the Problem of International Cooperation

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  • Wagner, R. Harrison

Abstract

The Prisoner's Dilemma game, Rousseau's image of the Stag Hunt, and the concept of a security dilemma have all been used to support the argument that much international conflict is the result of anarchy at the global level rather than the aggressive intentions of governments. This article argues that the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Stag Hunt are usually inadequate models of the problem they have been used to illuminate, and that a security dilemma as commonly defined need not have the implications that are ascribed to it. It also argues that developing more adequate models of the general problem of enforcing agreements in a condition of anarchy will help us to understand better why international cooperation is more easily achieved in some areas than in others.

Suggested Citation

  • Wagner, R. Harrison, 1983. "The Theory of Games and the Problem of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(2), pages 330-346, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:77:y:1983:i:02:p:330-346_24
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Barry O'Neill, 1987. "A Measure for Crisis Instability with an Application to Space-Based Antimissile Systems," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(4), pages 631-672, December.
    2. María Alexandra Ortiz Cabrera, 2019. "Colección Enrique Low Murtra, Tomo XII. Derecho Económico," Books, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Facultad de Derecho, number 1114.
    3. Carlo Carraro, 1997. "Modelling International Policy Games: Lessons from European Monetary Coordination," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 24(3), pages 163-177, October.
    4. Stephen J. Majeski & Shane Fricks, 1995. "Conflict And Cooperation in International Relations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 39(4), pages 622-645, December.
    5. Joshua S. Goldstein & Jon C. Pevehouse & Deborah J. Gerner & Shibley Telhami, 2001. "Reciprocity, Triangularity, and Cooperation in the Middle East, 1979-97," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(5), pages 594-620, October.
    6. Andreou, Andreas & Zombanakis, George, 2003. "Measuring Relative Military Security," MPRA Paper 78660, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 14 Jul 2003.
    7. Nakajima, Tetsuya, 2014. "Giving a Second Chance to a Disadvantaged Player Resolves the Prisoner’s Dilemma," MPRA Paper 59937, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. A. S. Andreou & G. A. Zombanakis, 2001. "A neural network measurement of relative military security - the case of Greece and Cyprus," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(4), pages 303-324.
    9. J. P. Bayer & V. A. Vasilyeva & I. A. Vetrenko, 2021. "Game Modeling of the Political Space: Analysis of Foreign Literature," Administrative Consulting, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration. North-West Institute of Management., issue 9.
    10. Andreou, Andreas S. & Zombanakis, George A., 2001. "A Neural Network Measurement of Relative Military Security: The Case of Greece and Cyprus," MPRA Paper 14539, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2001.

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