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中国贸易保护政策的政治影响因素研究 ——基于贸易政治经济学的理论与实证
[Research on affecting factors for Chinese Trade Protectionist Policy under Open Circumstance: A Theoretical and Empirical Test on Trade Political Economics]

Author

Listed:
  • Gu, ZhenHua
  • Shen, Yao

Abstract

本文以Grossman和Helpman的“保护待售”模型为基础，构建了在不完全竞争条件下的贸易保护政策影响因素分析模型，考察了中国贸易保护政策中的政治影响因素，并且利用2004-2012年中国36个行业的数据对结论进行了经验验证。结果表明：国内外利益集团是影响我国贸易政策的重要政治因素，国内外利益集团的影响方式分别是政治联系和外国政府的政治压力；国内利益集团政治联系的类型主要是代表委员类而非政府官员类；如果某行业部门中的国内利益集团被有效的组织起来，则该行业将会获得较高的贸易保护；如果某行业部门中的国外利益集团被有效的组织起来的话，则该行业将会更偏向于自由贸易。

Suggested Citation

  • Gu, ZhenHua & Shen, Yao, 2014. "中国贸易保护政策的政治影响因素研究 ——基于贸易政治经济学的理论与实证 [Research on affecting factors for Chinese Trade Protectionist Policy under Open Circumstance: A Theoretical and Empirical Test on Trade Political Economics]," MPRA Paper 57753, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:57753
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Phillip McCalman, 2004. "Protection for Sale and Trade Liberalization: an Empirical Investigation," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 81-94, February.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    利益集团；政治联系；政治压力;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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