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Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests

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  • Chowdhury, Subhasish
  • Sheremeta, Roman

Abstract

We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests, and show that asymmetric equilibria arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We then present existing contests where multiple equilibria exist under reasonably weak conditions.

Suggested Citation

  • Chowdhury, Subhasish & Sheremeta, Roman, 2011. "Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests," MPRA Paper 52104, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:52104
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Subhasish Chowdhury & Roman Sheremeta, 2011. "A generalized Tullock contest," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 413-420, June.
    2. Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. Vries, 2005. "Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(505), pages 583-601, July.
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    12. Takeshi Yamazaki, 2008. "On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure‐Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Asymmetric Rent‐Seeking Contests," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(2), pages 317-327, April.
    13. Alexander Matros, 2006. "Sad-Loser Lottery," Working Paper 204, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Dec 2008.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    rent-seeking; contest; asymmetric equilibrium; multiple equilibria;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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