Sad-Loser Lottery
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2011.
"Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 216-219, August.
- Subhashish Modak Chowdhury & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2010. "Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 10-12, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Chowdhury, Subhasish & Sheremeta, Roman, 2011. "Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests," MPRA Paper 52104, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2010. "Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 014, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
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