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To approve or not to approve: this is not the only question

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  • Alcantud, José Carlos R.
  • Laruelle, Annick

Abstract

This paper deals with electing candidates. In elections voters are frequently offered a small set of actions (voting in favor of one candidate, voting blank, spoiling the ballot, and not showing up). Thus voters can express neither a negative opinion nor an opinion on more than one candidate. Approval voting partially fills this gap by asking an opinion on all candidates. Still the choice is only between approval and non approval. However non approval may mean disapproval or just indifference or even absence of sufficient knowledge for approving the candidate. In this paper we characterize the dis&approval voting rule, a natural extension of approval voting that distinguishes between indifference and disapproval.

Suggested Citation

  • Alcantud, José Carlos R. & Laruelle, Annick, 2012. "To approve or not to approve: this is not the only question," MPRA Paper 41885, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:41885
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/41885/1/MPRA_paper_41885.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Antoinette Baujard & Herrade Igersheim, 2011. "Framed-field Experiment on Approval Voting and Evaluation Voting. Some Teachings to Reform the French Presidential Electoral System," Studies in Public Choice, in: Bernard Dolez & Bernard Grofman & Annie Laurent (ed.), In Situ and Laboratory Experiments on Electoral Law Reform, chapter 0, pages 69-89, Springer.
    2. Carlos Alós-Ferrer, 2006. "A Simple Characterization of Approval Voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(3), pages 621-625, December.
    3. Antoinette Baujard & Herrade Igersheim, 2011. "A Framed-field experiment on Approval voting and Evaluation voting," Post-Print halshs-00564256, HAL.
    4. Francisco Arcelus & Gary Mauser & Z. Spindler, 1978. "The right to vote no: revising the voting system and resuscitating the F-Y voter," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 67-83, December.
    5. Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn, 2010. "Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver (ed.), Handbook on Approval Voting, chapter 0, pages 19-37, Springer.
    6. Claude Hillinger, 2005. "The Case for Utilitarian Voting," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 23, pages 295-321.
    7. Hillinger, Claude, 2004. "Voting and the Cardinal Aggregation of Judgments," Discussion Papers in Economics 353, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pivato, Marcus, 2014. "Formal utilitarianism and range voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 50-56.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voting rule; approval voting; vote profile;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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