Why do Facebook and Twitter facilitate revolutions more than TV and radio?
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References listed on IDEAS
- Lohmann, Susanne, 1993. "A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(2), pages 319-333, June.
- Lohmann, Susanne, 1994. "Information Aggregation through Costly Political Action," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 518-530, June.
- Michael Suk-Young Chwe, 2000. "Communication and Coordination in Social Networks," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(1), pages 1-16.
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- Rosa-García, Alfonso & Kiss, Hubert Janos, 2011.
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- Alfonso Rosa García & Hubert Janos Kiss, 2012. "Coordination structures," Working Papers. Serie AD 2012-12, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
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More about this item
Keywords
social media; mass media; revolution; coordination game; sequential games;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BEC-2011-10-01 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CTA-2011-10-01 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-CUL-2011-10-01 (Cultural Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2011-10-01 (Social Norms and Social Capital)
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