On the mobilizing role of social media in revolutions: a game-theoretic approach
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References listed on IDEAS
- Michael Suk-Young Chwe, 2000. "Communication and Coordination in Social Networks," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(1), pages 1-16.
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- De Mesquita, Ethan Bueno, 2010. "Regime Change and Revolutionary Entrepreneurs," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 104(3), pages 446-466, August.
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More about this item
Keywords
social media; mass media; revolution; coordination game; sequential games;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
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