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Overthrowing the dictator: a game-theoretic approach to revolutions and media

Author

Listed:
  • Hubert Janos Kiss

    (MTA KRTK KTI
    Eötvös Loránd University)

  • Ismael Rodríguez-Lara

    (Middlesex University London)

  • Alfonso Rosa-García

    (Universidad Católica San Antonio de Murcia)

Abstract

A distinctive feature of recent revolutions was the key role of social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter and YouTube). In this paper, we study its role in mobilization. We assume that social media allow potential participants to observe the individual participation decisions of others, while traditional mass media allow potential participants to see only the total number of people who participated before them. We show that when individuals’ willingness to revolt is publicly known, then both sorts of media foster a successful revolution. However, when willingness to revolt is private information, only social media ensure that a revolt succeeds, with mass media multiple outcomes are possible, one of which has individuals not participating in the revolt. This suggests that social media enhance the likelihood that a revolution triumphs more than traditional mass media.

Suggested Citation

  • Hubert Janos Kiss & Ismael Rodríguez-Lara & Alfonso Rosa-García, 2017. "Overthrowing the dictator: a game-theoretic approach to revolutions and media," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(2), pages 329-355, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:49:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s00355-017-1067-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-017-1067-3
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    2. Masiliūnas, Aidas, 2019. "Overcoming inefficient lock-in in coordination games with sophisticated and myopic players," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 1-12.
    3. Capraro, Valerio & Rodriguez-Lara, Ismael & Ruiz-Martos, Maria J., 2020. "Preferences for efficiency, rather than preferences for morality, drive cooperation in the one-shot Stag-Hunt game," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    4. Dennis Ridley & Aryanne de Silva, 2020. "Game Theoretic Choices Between Corrupt Dictatorship Exit Emoluments and Nation-Building CDR Benefits: Is There a Nash Equilibrium?," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 65(1), pages 51-77, March.
    5. Michael Macgregor Perry & Hadi El-Amine, 2021. "Computational Efficiency in Multivariate Adversarial Risk Analysis Models," Papers 2110.12572, arXiv.org.
    6. Vicente Calabuig & Natalia Jiménez-Jiménez & Gonzalo Olcina & Ismael Rodriguez-Lara, 2024. "Coordinated and uncoordinated punishment in a team investment game," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 97(2), pages 191-217, September.
    7. Kiss, Hubert János & Rodriguez-Lara, Ismael & Rosa-Garcia, Alfonso, 2022. "Who withdraws first? Line formation during bank runs," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).

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