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Informatization, voter turnout and income inequality

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  • Ryo Arawatari

Abstract

In recent years, voter turnout has been decreasing in most industrial countries, and about 40% of all electors abstain from voting. This may affect income inequality and the GDP growth rate through a redistribution policy determined by majority voting. In this paper, we explore the reasons for this continuing decrease in voter turnout and assess its social costs. We conclude that informatization lowers voter turnout by generating an information overload, and that a decrease in voter turnout lowers GDP growth by limiting income redistribution.
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  • Ryo Arawatari, 2009. "Informatization, voter turnout and income inequality," The Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 7(1), pages 29-54, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jecinq:v:7:y:2009:i:1:p:29-54
    DOI: 10.1007/s10888-007-9062-z
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Milanovic, Branko, 2010. "Four critiques of the redistribution hypothesis: An assessment," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 147-154, March.
    2. Richard Thomas Watson & Kirk Plangger & Leyland Pitt & Amrit Tiwana, 2023. "A Theory of Information Compression: When Judgments Are Costly," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 34(3), pages 1089-1108, September.
    3. Luigi Aldieri & Gennaro Guida & Maxim Kotsemir & Concetto Paolo Vinci, 2019. "An investigation of impact of research collaboration on academic performance in Italy," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 2003-2040, July.
    4. Loek Groot & Daan Linde, 2016. "Income inequality, redistribution and the position of the decisive voter," The Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 14(3), pages 269-287, September.
    5. Tongkui Yu & Shu-Heng Chen, 2021. "Big Data, Scarce Attention and Decision-Making Quality," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 57(3), pages 827-856, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Income inequality; Information; Informatization; Voter turnout; Voting; D31; O15; O41; P16;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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