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The practice of the auction theory: The Colombian case

Author

Listed:
  • Espinosa, Miguel
  • Forero, German
  • Villaneda, Felipe

Abstract

In the world the use of auctions has shown two important trends: 1. their use has been extended to a greater number of countries and sectors, 2. the set of objects auctioned has increased exponentially. Colombia is not an exception. The number of auctions and items in the country is huge, the sums of money very large and in some cases the mistakes made are tremendous. Given that, it is strange that there is no existing article explaining the most important auctions used in the country. The present paper describes the principal auctions held in Colombia over the past 20 years. Each auction is described in detail characterizing not only the allocation process, but also some results and conclusions. The work shows how the use of simple economic theory can allow us to understand the mistakes present in some auctions (Third Channel Auction) or to learn from auctions that have proven to be successful over time (electricity sector). This review is sufficiently broad, to cover cattle auctions through to financial ones; sufficiently geographically decentralized, to include agents from both, forested areas and big cities; and sufficiently transversal, to cover the public and the private sectors.

Suggested Citation

  • Espinosa, Miguel & Forero, German & Villaneda, Felipe, 2011. "The practice of the auction theory: The Colombian case," MPRA Paper 31150, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:31150
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/31150/1/MPRA_paper_31150.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paul Klemperer, 2003. "Alfred Marshall Lecture: Using and Abusing Economic Theory," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(2-3), pages 272-300, 04/05.
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    3. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter.
    4. Matti Keloharju & Kjell G. Nyborg & Kristian Rydqvist, 2005. "Strategic Behavior and Underpricing in Uniform Price Auctions: Evidence from Finnish Treasury Auctions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(4), pages 1865-1902, August.
    5. Miguel A. Espinosa & Alvaro J. Riascos Villegas, 2010. "Strategic Behaviour, Resource Valuation and Competition in Electricity Markets," Documentos CEDE 6856, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    6. Ali Hortaçsu & David McAdams, 2010. "Mechanism Choice and Strategic Bidding in Divisible Good Auctions: An Empirical Analysis of the Turkish Treasury Auction Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(5), pages 833-865.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auctions; Privatization; Optimality; E¢ ciency.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • L90 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - General
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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