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L’emergenza dei tre lustri, la salma contesa e il gioco dell’Ultimatum. Alcune riflessioni sui problemi che caratterizzano le decisioni pubbliche in Italia
[The 15-years-long emergency, the burial-of-the dead conflict and the ultimatum game. Some remarks about public bodies’ decision-taking problems in Italy]

Author

Listed:
  • Villani, Salvatore

Abstract

Negli ultimi tempi, fra gli studiosi dei processi di formazione delle scelte pubbliche è in corso un interessante dibattito volto ad individuare le tecniche più appropriate per gestire in maniera efficace (ovvero in tempi rapidi e garantendo la stabilità e la durevolezza delle decisioni o degli accordi a-dottati) ed equa (il fatto che le controparti siano soddisfatte della decisione adottata o dell’accordo raggiunto costituisce una garanzia per la stabilità e la durevolezza degli stessi) i conflitti ambientali e, soprattutto, i cosiddetti «problemi di localizzazione indesiderata» (di opere pubbliche ed impianti). Ciascuna di queste tecniche rappresenta, tuttavia, un campo ancora in divenire, un universo tutto da esplorare ed inventare. Nel lavoro che segue si cercherà di far luce sulle questioni rilevanti, partendo dall’analisi di un re-cente caso pratico – la cd. «emergenza-rifiuti», o “emergenza dei tre lustri”, scoppiata nel napoletano – e fornendo contemporaneamente alcuni spunti teorici per costruire un nuovo modello interpretativo dei processi decisionali pubblici alla luce degli sviluppi di due nuove discipline situate ai confini tra diritto e scienza economica: la teoria evolutiva dei giochi e l'economia cognitiva.

Suggested Citation

  • Villani, Salvatore, 2008. "L’emergenza dei tre lustri, la salma contesa e il gioco dell’Ultimatum. Alcune riflessioni sui problemi che caratterizzano le decisioni pubbliche in Italia [The 15-years-long emergency, the burial-," MPRA Paper 29857, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 14 Sep 2008.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:29857
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    analisi delle decisioni collettive; teoria delle scelte pubbliche; risoluzione dei conflitti; teoria dei giochi; teoria della contrattazione; giochi cooperativi; teoria evolutiva dei giochi; neuroeconomia.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D87 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Neuroeconomics

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