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The Evolution of Social Norms and Individual Preferences

Author

Listed:
  • Rodrigo Harrison

    (Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.)

  • Mauricio Villena

Abstract

Why does an altruistically inclined player behave altruistically in some contexts and egoistically or spitefully in others? This article provides an economic explanation to this question. The basic argument is centered on the idea that social norms shape our preferences through a process of cultural learning. In particular, we claim that, in contexts with a stable norm of reciprocity, an altruistic player can respond in kind to egoistic or spiteful players by behaving either egoistically or spitefully when confronting them and yet continue to be an altruistic player. This is why, instead of studying the evolution of preferences as such, in this work we analyze the evolution of social norms that indirectly determine individual preferences and behavior. Such a study requires that we distinguish between players' behavioral preferences, or those individuals show with their behavior, and players' intrinsic preferences, or those they inherently support or favor. We argue that, whereas the former can change through the evolution of social norms, in this case a reciprocity norm, the latter are not subject to evolutionary pressures and, therefore, we assume them to be given.

Suggested Citation

  • Rodrigo Harrison & Mauricio Villena, 2008. "The Evolution of Social Norms and Individual Preferences," Documentos de Trabajo 333, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    • Handle: RePEc:ioe:doctra:333
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    File URL: https://www.economia.uc.cl/docs/doctra/dt-333.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bergstrom, Theodore C, 1995. "On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 58-81, March.
    2. Kockesen, Levent & Ok, Efe A. & Sethi, Rajiv, 2000. "The Strategic Advantage of Negatively Interdependent Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 274-299, June.
    3. van Damme, E.E.C., 1994. "Evolutionary game theory," Other publications TiSEM 136706d2-2bc9-4951-b6cb-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. van Damme, E.E.C., 1993. "Evolutionary game theory," Other publications TiSEM 0335175a-12c9-434b-965e-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. Kockesen, Levent & Ok, Efe A. & Sethi, Rajiv, 2000. "Evolution of Interdependent Preferences in Aggregative Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 303-310, May.
    6. Van Damme, Eric, 1994. "Evolutionary game theory," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 847-858, April.
    7. Mauricio G. Villena & Marcelo J. Villena, 2004. "Evolutionary Game Theory and Thorstein Veblen’s Evolutionary Economics: Is EGT Veblenian?," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 38(3), pages 585-610, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social norms; reciprocity; endogenous preferences; asymmetric evolutionary game;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values

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