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Road pricing as a citizen-candidate game

Author

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  • Marcucci, Edoardo
  • Marini, Marco

Abstract

We construct a political economy model to analyze the political acceptability of road pricing policies. We use a citizen-candidate framework with a population composed by three groups differing for their income level. We show that road pricing policies are never applied when there is no redistribution of the resources in favour of other modes of transport or when the congestion of these types of transport is relatively high. The results suggest that the efficiency of the redistribution of resources from road to the alternative types of transport as well as the fraction of the population that uses the road transport are key factors in explaining the adoption of road pricing schemes.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcucci, Edoardo & Marini, Marco, 2005. "Road pricing as a citizen-candidate game," MPRA Paper 29293, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:29293
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114.
    2. Richard Arnott & Tilmann Rave & Ronnie Schöb, 2005. "Alleviating Urban Traffic Congestion," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262012197, December.
    3. Hanna Armelius, 2005. "An Integrated Approach to Urban Road Pricing," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, University of Bath, vol. 39(1), pages 75-92, January.
    4. Frey, Bruno S. & Schneider, Friedrich & Pommerehne, Werner W., 1985. "Economists' opinions on environmental policy instruments: Analysis of a survey," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 62-71, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. De Borger, Bruno, 2018. "Special issue “The political economy of transport decisions”," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 13(C), pages 1-3.
    2. David Hensher & Corinne Mulley, 2014. "Complementing distance based charges with discounted registration fees in the reform of road user charges: the impact for motorists and government revenue," Transportation, Springer, vol. 41(4), pages 697-715, July.
    3. Marcucci, Edoardo & Le Pira, Michela & Gatta, Valerio & Inturri, Giuseppe & Ignaccolo, Matteo & Pluchino, Alessandro, 2017. "Simulating participatory urban freight transport policy-making: Accounting for heterogeneous stakeholders’ preferences and interaction effects," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 69-86.
    4. Russo, Antonio, 2013. "Voting on road congestion policy," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(5), pages 707-724.
    5. de Palma, Andre & Marcucci, Edoardo & Niskanen, Esko & Wieland, Bernhard, 2005. "Introduction," European Transport \ Trasporti Europei, ISTIEE, Institute for the Study of Transport within the European Economic Integration, issue 31, pages 1-5.
    6. De Borger, Bruno & Russo, Antonio, 2018. "The political economy of cordon tolls," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 133-148.
    7. Jesper de Groote & Jos van Ommeren & Hans R. A. Koster, 2018. "The Impact of Parking Policy on House Prices," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, University of Bath, vol. 52(3), pages 267-26-282.
    8. Souche-Le Corvec, Stéphanie & Mercier, Aurélie & Ovtracht, Nicolas & Chevallier, Amandine, 2019. "Urban toll and electric vehicles: The winning ticket for Lyon Metropolitan Area (France)," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 17-33.
    9. Gatta, Valerio & Marcucci, Edoardo, 2014. "Urban freight transport and policy changes: Improving decision makers' awareness via an agent-specific approach," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 248-252.
    10. Bruno Borger & Stef Proost, 2016. "The political economy of pricing and capacity decisions for congestible local public goods in a federal state," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 23(5), pages 934-959, October.
    11. De Borger, Bruno & Proost, Stef, 2012. "Transport policy competition between governments: A selective survey of the literature," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 35-48.
    12. Quaglione, Davide & Cassetta, Ernesto & Crociata, Alessandro & Marra, Alessandro & Sarra, Alessandro, 2019. "An assessment of the role of cultural capital on sustainable mobility behaviours: Conceptual framework and empirical evidence," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 24-34.
    13. Evangelinos, Christos & Tscharaktschiew, Stefan & Marcucci, Edoardo & Gatta, Valerio, 2018. "Pricing workplace parking via cash-out: Effects on modal choice and implications for transport policy," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 369-380.
    14. Ren, Tao & Huang, Hai-Jun, 2020. "A competitive system with transit and highway: Revisiting the political feasibility of road pricing," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 42-56.
    15. Boggio, Margherita & Beria, Paolo, 2019. "The role of transport supply in the acceptability of pollution charge extension. The case of Milan," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 92-106.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Road pricing; Political acceptability; Citizen-candidate.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D0 - Microeconomics - - General
    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • B21 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Microeconomics
    • L90 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - General
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • A10 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - General

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