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Ownership Structure and Risk-taking Behavior: Evidence from Banks in Korea and Japan

Author

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  • Chun, Sun Eae
  • Nagano, Mamoru
  • Lee, Min Hwan

Abstract

This study analyzes the effects of managerial ownership on the risk-taking behavior of Korean and Japanese banks during the relatively regulated period of the late 1990s to the early 2000s. It finds that managerial ownership alone does not affect either the risk or the profit levels of Korean banks. In contrast, an increase in managerial ownership adds to the total risk of Japanese banks. However, increased risk-taking behavior does not produce higher levels of profit for Japanese banks. The coefficients of the interaction term between franchise value and managerial ownership are negative and statistically significant for both the Korean and the Japanese banking industries. This means that an increase in managerial ownership at banks with high franchise values discourages risk-taking behavior. The result confirms the disciplinary role of franchise value on the risk-taking behavior of banks. It also falls in line with previous literature supporting the moral hazard hypothesis based on research into the economies of the U.S. and other countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Chun, Sun Eae & Nagano, Mamoru & Lee, Min Hwan, 2010. "Ownership Structure and Risk-taking Behavior: Evidence from Banks in Korea and Japan," MPRA Paper 25334, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:25334
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    Cited by:

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank ownership structure; managerial ownership; moral hazard; franchise value; risk-taking behavior;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General

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