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Are Large Shareholders Effective Monitors? An Investigation of Share Ownership and Corporate Performance

In: Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment

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  • Richard J. Zeckhauser
  • John Pound

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Suggested Citation

  • Richard J. Zeckhauser & John Pound, 1990. "Are Large Shareholders Effective Monitors? An Investigation of Share Ownership and Corporate Performance," NBER Chapters, in: Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment, pages 149-180, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:11471
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stein, Jeremy C, 1988. "Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 61-80, February.
    2. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-329, May.
    3. Pound, John & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1990. "Clearly Heard on the Street: The Effect of Takeover Rumors on Stock Prices," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(3), pages 291-308, July.
    4. Holderness, Clifford G. & Sheehan, Dennis P., 1985. "Raiders or saviors? The evidence on six controversial investors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 555-555, December.
    5. Easterbrook, Frank H, 1984. "Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(4), pages 650-659, September.
    6. Sudipto Bhattacharya, 1979. "Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and "The Bird in the Hand" Fallacy," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 259-270, Spring.
    7. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    8. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation," Scholarly Articles 29407535, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    9. repec:bla:jfinan:v:43:y:1988:i:1:p:1-19 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Michael S. Rozeff, 1982. "Growth, Beta And Agency Costs As Determinants Of Dividend Payout Ratios," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 5(3), pages 249-259, September.
    11. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January.
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