Cognitive mechanisms for human flocking dynamics
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DOI: 10.1007/s42001-018-0017-x
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Keywords
Complex game dynamics; Human collective behavior; Behavioral game theory; Cognitive game theory; Iterated reasoning; Adaptive learning;All these keywords.
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