IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/19870.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Correlated equilibria in competitive staff selection problem

Author

Listed:
  • Ramsey, David M.
  • Szajowski, Krzysztof

Abstract

This paper deals with an extension of the concept of correlated strategies to Markov stopping games. The idea of this paper was presented at Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, International Conference in Memory of Jerzy Łoś (1920 - 1998), Warsaw, September 2004. The Nash equilibrium approach to solving nonzero-sum stopping games may give multiple solutions. An arbitrator can suggest to each player the decision to be applied at each stage based on a joint distribution over the players' decisions. This is a form of equilibrium selection. Examples of correlated equilibria in nonzero-sum games related to the staff selection competition in the case of two departments are given. Utilitarian, egalitarian, republican and libertarian concepts of correlated equilibria selection are used.

Suggested Citation

  • Ramsey, David M. & Szajowski, Krzysztof, 2004. "Correlated equilibria in competitive staff selection problem," MPRA Paper 19870, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2006.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:19870
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19870/2/MPRA_paper_19870.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), 2002. "Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 3, number 3.
    2. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
    3. Peeters, R.J.A.P. & Potters, J.A.M., 1999. "On the Structure of the Set of Correlated Equilibria in Two-by-Two Bimatrix Games," Discussion Paper 1999-45, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    4. Hak Chun, Young, 1996. "Selecting the best choice in the weighted secretary problem," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 135-147, July.
    5. Forges, Francoise M, 1986. "An Approach to Communication Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1375-1385, November.
    6. Bruce D. Craven & Sardar M. N. Islam, 2005. "Optimization in Economics and Finance," Dynamic Modeling and Econometrics in Economics and Finance, Springer, number 978-0-387-24280-4, May.
    7. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6019 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. David M., Ramsey & Krzysztof, Szajowski, 2000. "Bilateral Approach to the Secretary Problem," MPRA Paper 19888, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2003.
    9. Thomson, William, 1994. "Cooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 35, pages 1237-1284, Elsevier.
    10. Chun, Young H., 1999. "Selecting the best choice in the full information group interview problem," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 119(3), pages 635-651, December.
    11. Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2002. "Correlated Equilibrium in Stochastic Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 362-399, February.
    12. Stein, William E. & Seale, Darryl A. & Rapoport, Amnon, 2003. "Analysis of heuristic solutions to the best choice problem," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 151(1), pages 140-152, November.
    13. Eilon Solan, 2001. "Characterization of correlated equilibria in stochastic games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(2), pages 259-277.
    14. Gerard-Varet, L. A. & Moulin, H., 1978. "Correlation and duopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 123-149, October.
    15. Seale, Darryl A. & Rapoport, Amnon, 1997. "Sequential Decision Making with Relative Ranks: An Experimental Investigation of the "Secretary Problem">," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 221-236, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ramsey, David M. & Szajowski, Krzysztof, 2008. "Selection of a correlated equilibrium in Markov stopping games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 184(1), pages 185-206, January.
    2. Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan, 2012. "Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 222-234.
    3. Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi, 2015. "Correlated Equilibria in Stochastic Games with Borel Measurable Payoffs," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 120-135, March.
    4. John Duffy & Ernest K. Lai & Wooyoung Lim, 2017. "Coordination via correlation: an experimental study," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(2), pages 265-304, August.
    5. Forgo, Ferenc & Fulop, Janos & Prill, Maria, 2005. "Game theoretic models for climate change negotiations," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 160(1), pages 252-267, January.
    6. Heng Liu, 2017. "Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1037-1069, November.
    7. Bernhard von Stengel & Françoise Forges, 2008. "Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium: Definition and Computational Complexity," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 33(4), pages 1002-1022, November.
    8. Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "General Properties of Long-Run Supergames," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 319-350, June.
    9. F. Forges & B. von Stengel, 2002. "Computionally Efficient Coordination in Games Trees," THEMA Working Papers 2002-05, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    10. Yuval Heller, 2012. "Sequential Correlated Equilibria in Stopping Games," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 60(1), pages 209-224, February.
    11. Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau, 2021. "Equilibria in infinite games of incomplete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(2), pages 311-360, June.
    12. Konstantinos Georgalos & Indrajit Ray & Sonali SenGupta, 2020. "Nash versus coarse correlation," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(4), pages 1178-1204, December.
    13. Tristan Tomala, 2011. "Fault Reporting in Partially Known Networks and Folk Theorems," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 59(3), pages 754-763, June.
    14. José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez & António Osório & Josep E. Peris, 2015. "From Bargaining Solutions to Claims Rules: A Proportional Approach," Games, MDPI, vol. 6(1), pages 1-7, March.
    15. repec:dau:papers:123456789/8159 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Vieille, Nicolas, 2002. "Stochastic games: Recent results," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 48, pages 1833-1850, Elsevier.
    17. J. Neil Bearden & Amnon Rapoport & Ryan O. Murphy, 2006. "Sequential Observation and Selection with Rank-Dependent Payoffs: An Experimental Study," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 52(9), pages 1437-1449, September.
    18. Robert J. Aumann, 2007. "War and Peace," Chapters, in: Jean-Philippe Touffut (ed.), Augustin Cournot: Modelling Economics, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    19. Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 2003. "Cheap talk in games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 45-71, January.
    20. Fabio Galeotti & Maria Montero & Anders Poulsen, 2022. "The Attraction and Compromise Effects in Bargaining: Experimental Evidence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(4), pages 2987-3007, April.
    21. Françoise Forges, 2006. "Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information Revisited," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 61(4), pages 329-344, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    correlated equilibria; Nash equilibria; non-zero sum game; secretary problem;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C68 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computable General Equilibrium Models
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D58 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:19870. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.