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Contrat de travail et précarisation : une modélisation de l’information asymétrique d’une situation atypique, cas des pays pauvres et en développement
[Employment contract and insecurity jobs: asymmetric information modelling of atypical situation, case of poor and less developed countries]

Author

Listed:
  • El Bouhadi, Abdelhamid

Abstract

Our aim in this paper is dedicated to study the relations of recruiting among the employee and the employer in a frame characterized by the insecurity conditions of job and large scale of unemployment. The recruiting relationship that we will study is atypical as far as the offered salary is not a fixed minimum wage. The hiring contract between the employer and the employee in the developing labour markets is made with different conditions regarding to others, mainly in the developed countries. In these countries, the hiring signature of contract is linked to some preconditions like as the regularization statutory of hiring, the minimum of job security, wage and working rights in the case of unfair dismissal. In these conditions and under high level of costs which are engaged by the employer in order to research the skilled work even to pay the various payroll charges, the Principal has been faced with asymmetric information problem concerning the adverse selection linked to the nature of Agent type (informative characteristic of the employee): is it the check or the bad Agent type? In order to reduce this informative asymmetry, the Principal offers the various recruiting contracts with various pecuniary motivations. The mechanism of game can be a direct mechanism designer where the optimal strategy of the Agent is to announce its true type (it’s a situation where is benefit for the Agent to make sincere announcements) in order to maximize his expected utility. This standard modelling of Principal/Agent theory is not adapted with the labour markets situation in the case of poor and less developed countries. In the case of labour markets where the hiring conditions are much unsecured, we note that the Incentive Compatibility and the Individual Rationality of Agent do not exist. In fact, we are facing a problem in which there is a sort of indecision of reserved salary which allows the Agent to know if it is relatively well paid or not. Our aim in this article is to try to find an adequate modelling in the case of developing labour markets situation under the frame of Principal/Agent theory.

Suggested Citation

  • El Bouhadi, Abdelhamid, 2006. "Contrat de travail et précarisation : une modélisation de l’information asymétrique d’une situation atypique, cas des pays pauvres et en développement [Employment contract and insecurity jobs: asym," MPRA Paper 19859, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:19859
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Moroccan Labour Market; Insecure Jobs; Adverse Selection; Principal/Agent Theory; Poor and Developing Countries.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J81 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Standards - - - Working Conditions
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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