IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/prs/reveco/reco_0035-2764_1996_num_47_3_409779.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

L'impact des options extérieures sur les échanges en information asymétrique

Author

Listed:
  • Bruno Jullien
  • Claude Jessua

Abstract

[eng] The paper studies the optimal contract offered by a buyer to a producer, under asymétrie information on both the marginal cost and the fixed cost. The model illustrates the results obtained when generalizing the adverse selection Principal-Agent model by relaxing the assumptions on outside options. Asymétrie informa­tion can reduce or increase the volume of trade. The informational rent is not monotonie. Quantity distortions relate to the shape and the curvature of the func­tion linking the fixed cost to the marginal cost. [fre] Nous étudions le contrat optimal offert par un acheteur à un producteur qui dispose d'une information privée sur son coût marginal et son coût fixe. Ce modèle illustre les résultats qui apparaissent lorsqu'on généralise le modèle Prin­cipal-Agent de sélection adverse en relâchant les hypothèses sur les options exté­rieures. L'information asymétrique peut réduire ou augmenter le volume des échanges. La rente d'information n'est plus monotone. Les distorsions dépendent de la pente et de la courbure de la relation liant le coût fixe au coût marginal.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruno Jullien & Claude Jessua, 1996. "L'impact des options extérieures sur les échanges en information asymétrique," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 47(3), pages 437-446.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1996_num_47_3_409779
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1996.409779
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1996.409779
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.3406/reco.1996.409779
    Download Restriction: Data and metadata provided by Persée are licensed under a Creative Commons "Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0" License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/

    File URL: https://www.persee.fr/doc/reco_0035-2764_1996_num_47_3_409779
    Download Restriction: Data and metadata provided by Persée are licensed under a Creative Commons "Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0" License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.3406/reco.1996.409779?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Amrstong, Mark & Cowan, Simon & Vickers, John, 1995. "Nonlinear pricing and price cap regulation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 33-55, September.
    2. Holmstrom, Bengt & Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1799-1819, November.
    3. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1992. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 1-42, January.
    4. Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1989. "Countervailing incentives in agency problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 294-313, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Antonio Acconcia & Riccardo Martina & Salvatore Piccolo, 2008. "Vertical Restraints Under Asymmetric Information: On The Role Of Participation Constraints," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(2), pages 379-401, June.
    2. Fabian Herweg & Daniel Müller, 2014. "Price Discrimination in Input Markets: Quantity Discounts and Private Information," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 124(577), pages 776-804, June.
    3. Jullien, Bruno, 2000. "Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 1-47, July.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Watson, Joel, 2002. "Starting Small and Commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 176-199, January.
    2. Stefan Ambec & Michel Poitevin, 2000. "Organizational Design of R & D Activities," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0190, Econometric Society.
    3. Jin Yeub Kim, 2022. "Neutral public good mechanisms," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 17(4), pages 1-16, April.
    4. Celik, Gorkem, 2009. "Mechanism design with collusive supervision," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 69-95, January.
    5. Dosis, Anastasios, 2018. "On signalling and screening in markets with asymmetric information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 140-149.
    6. Børsum, Øystein, 2011. "Employee Stock Options," Memorandum 11/2010, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    7. Cramton Peter C. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 255-283, August.
    8. Canice Prendergast & Lars Stole, 2001. "Barter, Liquidity and Market Segmentation," CESifo Working Paper Series 586, CESifo.
    9. Bannier, Christina E. & Feess, Eberhard & Packham, Natalie, 2014. "Incentive schemes, private information and the double-edged role of competition for agents," CFS Working Paper Series 475, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    10. Serrano, Roberto & Vohra, Rajiv, 2007. "Information transmission in coalitional voting games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 117-137, May.
    11. Emanuele Gerratana & Levent Koçkesen, 2015. "Commitment without reputation: renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 19(3), pages 173-209, September.
    12. El Bouhadi, Abdelhamid, 2006. "Contrat de travail et précarisation : une modélisation de l’information asymétrique d’une situation atypique, cas des pays pauvres et en développement [Employment contract and insecurity jobs: asym," MPRA Paper 19859, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Watson, Joel, 1999. "Starting Small and Renegotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 52-90, March.
    14. Mylovanov, Timofiy & Troger, Thomas E., 2012. "Informed principal problems in generalized private values environments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
    15. Inderst, Roman, 2001. "Incentive schemes as a signaling device," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(4), pages 455-465, April.
    16. Theodoros M. Diasakos & Kostas Koufopoulos, 2011. "Efficient Nash Equilibrium under Adverse Selection," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 215, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    17. Christina E. Bannier & Eberhard Feess & Natalie Packham & Markus Walzl, 2021. "Differentiation and Risk Aversion in Imperfectly Competitive Labor Markets," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 177(1), pages 1-27.
    18. Kim, Jin Yeub, 2017. "Interim third-party selection in bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 645-665.
    19. Davoodalhosseini, Seyed Mohammadreza, 2019. "Constrained efficiency with adverse selection and directed search," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 568-593.
    20. Geoffroy de Clippel & Jack Fanning & Kareen Rozen, 2022. "Bargaining over Contingent Contracts under Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(5), pages 1522-1554, May.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1996_num_47_3_409779. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Equipe PERSEE (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.persee.fr/collection/reco .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.