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Crony Capitalism: Caricature or Category?

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  • Mazumdar, Surajit

Abstract

This paper, part of a series on Crony Capitalism and Contemporary India, examines the conceptual meaning of the term crony capitalism, which has acquired considerable popularity since it was used as an explanation for the East Asian crisis. The paper argues that the conception of crony capitalism as a description of a distinct kind of capitalism associated with the State playing a key role in the allocation process suffers from serious deficiencies and therefore does not provide a suitable framework for understanding the business-state interaction. While the phenomenon that is called cronyism is very real, it is widespread in modern capitalism and not a peculiar feature of capitalism characterized by a particular economic policy regime. In fact, crony capitalism may lie at the very heart of the contemporary global capitalist order, and this crony capitalism may explain why the concept of crony capitalism has acquired such prominence in recent times

Suggested Citation

  • Mazumdar, Surajit, 2008. "Crony Capitalism: Caricature or Category?," MPRA Paper 19626, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:19626
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19626/1/MPRA_paper_19626.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Mazumdar, Surajit, 2008. "Crony Capitalism and India: Before and After Liberalization," MPRA Paper 19627, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Oznur Ozdamar & Eleftherios Giovanis & Sahizer Samuk, 2020. "State business relations and the dynamics of job flows in Egypt and Turkey," Eurasian Business Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 10(4), pages 519-558, December.
    3. Mohamed Ismail Sabry, 2017. "Informal state–business connections, institutions, and economic growth," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 34(2), pages 233-258, August.
    4. Mohamed Ismail Sabry, 2019. "Fostering innovation under institutional deficiencies: formal state–business consultation or cronyism?," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 36(1), pages 79-110, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    crony capitalism; business-state relations; corporate finance; state intervention;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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