IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/16265.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Pay What You Like

Author

Listed:
  • Fernandez, Jose
  • Nahata, Babu

Abstract

We show that when a seller of a di¤erentiated good o¤ers the product allowing consumers an option to pay what they like, then all consumers will never free ride in equilibrium when their valuations of the good are positive, and, under certain conditions, all will consumers would pay. Further, for the seller this pricing could be more pro�table than uniform pricing. If consumers consider the social cost of free riding, or not paying a "fair" price, then our results show that consumers, rather than free riding, may not opt for this option. Instead, they prefer to purchase the good at the market price from a price-setting firm.

Suggested Citation

  • Fernandez, Jose & Nahata, Babu, 2009. "Pay What You Like," MPRA Paper 16265, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:16265
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16265/1/MPRA_paper_16265.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cabral, Luis M. B., 2000. "Introduction to Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262032864, April.
    2. Nahata, Babu & Ostaszewski, Krzysztof & Sahoo, Prasanna, 1999. "Buffet Pricing," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 72(2), pages 215-228, April.
    3. Mathias Dewatripont & Lars Peter Hansen & Stephen Turnovsky, 2003. "Advances in economics and econometrics :theory and applications," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9557, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    4. Sparks, Roger, 1986. "A Model of Involuntary Unemployment and Wage Rigidity: Worker Incentives and the Threat of Dismissal," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(4), pages 560-581, October.
    5. Birger Wernerfelt, 2008. "Class Pricing," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 27(5), pages 755-763, 09-10.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Bourreau, Marc & Doğan, Pınar & Hong, Sounman, 2015. "Making money by giving it for free: Radiohead’s pre-release strategy for In Rainbows," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 77-93.
    2. Isaac, R. Mark & P. Lightle, John & A. Norton, Douglas, 2015. "The pay-what-you-want business model: Warm glow revenues and endogenous price discrimination," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 215-223.
    3. Samahita Margaret, 2020. "Pay-What-You-Want in Competition," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 1-16, January.
    4. Gerpott Torsten J., 2016. "A review of the empirical literature on Pay-What-You-Want price setting," Management & Marketing, Sciendo, vol. 11(4), pages 566-596, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. John Geanakoplos & Robert Axtell & J. Doyne Farmer & Peter Howitt & Benjamin Conlee & Jonathan Goldstein & Matthew Hendrey & Nathan M. Palmer & Chun-Yi Yang, 2012. "Getting at Systemic Risk via an Agent-Based Model of the Housing Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(3), pages 53-58, May.
    2. Saki Bigio & Eduardo Zilberman, 2020. "Speculation-Driven Business Cycles," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 865, Central Bank of Chile.
    3. , & ,, 2013. "Selection-free predictions in global games with endogenous information and multiple equilibria," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(3), September.
    4. Chen, Qi & Goldstein, Itay & Jiang, Wei, 2010. "Payoff complementarities and financial fragility: Evidence from mutual fund outflows," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 239-262, August.
    5. Omar Al-Ubaydli & John A. List, 2019. "How natural field experiments have enhanced our understanding of unemployment," Nature Human Behaviour, Nature, vol. 3(1), pages 33-39, January.
    6. Illoong Kwon, 2005. "Threat of Dismissal: Incentive or Sorting?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(4), pages 797-838, October.
    7. Karp, Larry S., 2008. "Correct (and misleading) arguments for using market based pollution control policies," CUDARE Working Papers 42868, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    8. Hernán Vallejo, 2007. "A generalized index of market power," Revista de Economía del Rosario, Universidad del Rosario, December.
    9. König, Philipp & Anand, Kartik & Heinemann, Frank, 2013. "The ‘Celtic Crisis’: Guarantees, transparency, and systemic liquidity risk," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79747, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    10. Yoo, Seung Han, 2014. "Learning a population distribution," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 188-201.
    11. Ya-Chin Wang, 2013. "Optimal R&D Policy and Managerial Delegation Under Vertically Differentiated Duopoly," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 81(4), pages 605-624, December.
    12. Johan Eyckmans & Cathrine Hagem, 2009. "The European Union's Potential for Strategic Emissions Trading through Minimal Permit Sale Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 2809, CESifo.
    13. Kasahara, Tetsuya, 2009. "Coordination failure among multiple lenders and the role and effects of public policy," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 183-198, June.
    14. Azevedo, Eduardo M. & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2019. "An example of non-existence of Riley equilibrium in markets with adverse selection," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 152-157.
    15. Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 2011. "Fire Sales in Finance and Macroeconomics," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 25(1), pages 29-48, Winter.
    16. Aldashev, Gani, 2010. "Political Information Acquisition for Social Exchange," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 5(1), pages 1-25, April.
    17. Jacquemet Nicolas & Zylbersztejn Adam, 2013. "Learning, Words and Actions: Experimental Evidence on Coordination-Improving Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 215-247, July.
    18. Kochar, Anjini & Nagabhushana, Closepet & Sarkar, Ritwik & Shah, Rohan & Singh, Geeta, 2022. "Financial access and women's role in household decisions: Empirical evidence from India's National Rural Livelihoods project," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 155(C).
    19. Adrien Blanchet & Pascal Mossay & Filippo Santambrogio, 2016. "Existence And Uniqueness Of Equilibrium For A Spatial Model Of Social Interactions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57(1), pages 31-60, February.
    20. Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Michelucci, Fabio, 2014. "On the optimality of not allocating," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 233-235.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    pay-what-you-like pricing; self-selection; multidimensional screening; buffet pricing.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:16265. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.