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Perfect correlated equilibria in stopping games

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  • Heller, Yuval

Abstract

We prove that every undiscounted multi-player stopping game in discrete time admits an approximate correlated equilibrium. Moreover, the equilibrium has five appealing properties: (1) “Trembling-hand” perfectness - players do not use non-credible threats; (2) Normal-form correlation - communication is required only before the game starts; (3) Uniformness - it is an approximate equilibrium in any long enough finite-horizon game and in any discounted game with high enough discount factor; (4) Universal correlation device -the device does not depend on the specific parameters of the game. (5) Canonical - the signal each player receives is equivalent to the strategy he plays in equilibrium.

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  • Heller, Yuval, 2009. "Perfect correlated equilibria in stopping games," MPRA Paper 15646, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:15646
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Myerson, R B, 1986. "Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 15(3), pages 133-154.
    2. Myerson, Roger B, 1986. "Multistage Games with Communication," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 323-358, March.
    3. Barry Nalebuff & John G. Riley, 1984. "Asymmetric Equilibrium in the War of Attrition," UCLA Economics Working Papers 317, UCLA Department of Economics.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    stochastic games; stopping games; correlated equilibrium; perfect equilibrium; Ramsey Theorem.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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