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Existence And Optimality Of Mediation Schemes For Games With Communication

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  • Sudhir A. Shah

    (Delhi School of Economics)

Abstract

This paper explicitly considers the possibility of a mediator selecting equilibria in incomplete information environments. We study two models of mediated communication in incomplete information games the first model with a disinterested mediator and second with an interested mediator. The notion of ex post incentive compatibility (EPJC) is defined as a solution concept for such models and its existence is shown in very general settings. The second main result shows the existence of an optimal EPIC when optimality is defined in terms of the mediator's welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Sudhir A. Shah, 1997. "Existence And Optimality Of Mediation Schemes For Games With Communication," Working papers 51, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cde:cdewps:51
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Forges, Francoise M, 1986. "An Approach to Communication Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1375-1385, November.
    2. Myerson, Roger B, 1986. "Multistage Games with Communication," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 323-358, March.
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