A type-adjustable mechanism where the designer may obtain more payoffs by optimally controlling distributions of agents' types
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2019.
"Information Design: A Unified Perspective,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(1), pages 44-95, March.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Working Papers 089_2017, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2075R3, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Mar 2018.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2075R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Mar 2017.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2075, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 11867, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2075R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Nov 2017.
- Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Välimäki, 2019.
"Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(2), pages 235-274, June.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Välimäki, Juuso, 2017. "Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction," CEPR Discussion Papers 12240, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2017. "Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2102, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2017. "Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2102R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2018.
- Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2005.
"Information in Mechanism Design,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1532R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2006.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Välimäki, Juuso, 2006. "Information in Mechanism Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 5494, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2005. "Information in Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1532, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Szech, Nora, 2011. "Optimal advertising of auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2596-2607.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2007.
"Information structures in optimal auctions,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 580-609, November.
- Dirk Bergemann & Martin Pesendorfer, 2001. "Information Structures in Optimal Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1323, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2001. "Information Structures in Optimal Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 2991, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hedlund, Jonas, 2015. "Persuasion with communication costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 28-40.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1981.
"Optimal Auction Design,"
Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Optimal Auction Design," Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Alessandro Pavan & Ilya Segal & Juuso Toikka, 2014. "Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(2), pages 601-653, March.
- Szech, Nora, 2011. "Optimal disclosure of costly information packages in auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 462-469.
- Nguyen, Anh & Tan, Teck Yong, 2021. "Bayesian persuasion with costly messages," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
- Emir Kamenica, 2019. "Bayesian Persuasion and Information Design," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 11(1), pages 249-272, August.
- Alex Gershkov, 2009. "Optimal auctions and information disclosure," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(4), pages 335-344, December.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Bergemann, Dirk & Wambach, Achim, 2015.
"Sequential information disclosure in auctions,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 1074-1095.
- Dirk Bergemann & Achim Wambach, 2013. "Sequential Information Disclosure in Auctions," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000771, David K. Levine.
- Dirk Bergemann & Achim Wambach, 2013. "Sequential Information Disclosure in Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1900R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Oct 2014.
- Dirk Bergemann & Achim Wambach, 2013. "Sequential Information Disclosure in Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1900, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 679-701.
- Farzaneh Farhadi & Demosthenis Teneketzis, 2022. "Dynamic Information Design: A Simple Problem on Optimal Sequential Information Disclosure," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 443-484, June.
- Terstiege, Stefan, 2013. "Precontractual Investigation and Sequential Screening," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 429, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Schweizer, Nikolaus & Szech, Nora, 2017.
"Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 86-111.
- Nikolaus Schweizer & Nora Szech, 2015. "Revenues and Welfare in Auctions with Information Release," CESifo Working Paper Series 5501, CESifo.
- Schweizer, Nikolaus & Szech, Nora, 2015. "Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2015-301, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Szech, Nora & Schweizer, Nikolaus, 2015. "Revenues and Welfare in Auctions with Information Release," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113041, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Schweizer, Nikolaus & Szech, Nora, 2015. "Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release," Working Paper Series in Economics 67, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
- Shih-Tang Su & Vijay G. Subramanian & Grant Schoenebeck, 2021. "Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials," Papers 2110.09594, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2021.
- Hao Li & Xianwen Shi, 2017.
"Discriminatory Information Disclosure,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(11), pages 3363-3385, November.
- Hao Li & Xianwen Shi, 2013. "Discriminatory Information Disclosure," Working Papers tecipa-497, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Hao Li & Xianwen Shi, 2017. "Discriminatory Information Disclosure," Working Papers tecipa-583, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Pavan, 2015. "Introduction to JET Symposium Issue on "Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design"," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2016, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Pycia, Marek & Woodward, Kyle, 2021. "Auctions of Homogeneous Goods: A Case for Pay-as-Bid," CEPR Discussion Papers 15656, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Strack, Philipp, 2022.
"Progressive participation,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(3), July.
- Dirk Bergemann & Philipp Strack, 2019. "Progressive Participation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2189R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jul 2020.
- Dirk Bergemann & Philipp Strack, 2019. "Progressive Participation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2189R3, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Nov 2020.
- Dirk Bergemann & Philipp Strack, 2019. "Progressive Participation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2189R4, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jul 2021.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Strack, Philipp, 2020. "Progressive Participation," CEPR Discussion Papers 15111, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dirk Bergemann & Philipp Strack, 2019. "Progressive Participation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2189, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Philipp Strack, 2019. "Progressive Participation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2189R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2020.
- Monte, Daniel & Linhares, Luis Henrique, 2023. "Stealth Startups, Clauses, and Add-ons: A Model of Strategic Obfuscation," MPRA Paper 115926, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Papadimitriou, Christos & Pierrakos, George & Psomas, Alexandros & Rubinstein, Aviad, 2022. "On the complexity of dynamic mechanism design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 399-427.
- Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2022.
"Screening with Persuasion,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
2338, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2023. "Screening with Persuasion," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2338R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2022. "Screening with Persuasion," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2338R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Heumann, Tibor & Morris, Stephen, 2023. "Screening with Persuasion," CEPR Discussion Papers 17898, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Heumann, Tibor & Morris, Stephen, 2022. "Screening with Persuasion," CEPR Discussion Papers 17502, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2022. "Screening with Persuasion," Papers 2212.03360, arXiv.org.
- Cristián Troncoso-Valverde, 2018.
"Releasing information in private-value second-price auctions,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(3), pages 781-817, May.
- Cristián Troncoso Valverde, 2011. "Information Provision in Competing Auctions," Working Papers 25, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad Diego Portales.
- Cristián Troncoso-Valverde, 2015. "Information Release in Second–Price Auctions," Serie Working Papers 15, Universidad del Desarrollo, School of Business and Economics.
- Alireza Fallah & Michael I. Jordan & Annie Ulichney, 2024. "Fair Allocation in Dynamic Mechanism Design," Papers 2406.00147, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
- Jihyeok Jung & Chan-Oi Song & Deok-Joo Lee & Kiho Yoon, 2024. "Optimal Mechanism in a Dynamic Stochastic Knapsack Environment," Papers 2402.14269, arXiv.org.
- Schottmüller, Christoph, 2023. "Optimal information structures in bilateral trade," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.
- Shi, Xianwen, 2012.
"Optimal auctions with information acquisition,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 666-686.
- Xianwen Shi, 2007. "Optimal Auctions with Information Acquisition," Working Papers tecipa-302, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Haoyang Wu, 2023. "Constructing a type-adjustable mechanism to yield Pareto-optimal outcomes," Papers 2309.01096, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.
- Pham, Hien, 2023. "How Information Design Shapes Optimal Selling Mechanisms," MPRA Paper 120462, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 17 Mar 2024.
More about this item
Keywords
Mechanism design; Optimal auction; Bayesian implementation.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2022-06-27 (Economic Design)
- NEP-GTH-2022-06-27 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2022-06-27 (Microeconomics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:113150. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.