Report NEP-DES-2022-06-27

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon.

Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Chao Huang, 2022. "Two-sided matching with firms' complementary preferences," Papers 2205.05599, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
• Mustafa Oguz Afacan & Umut Dur & A. Arda Gitmez & Ozgur Y{i}lmaz, 2022. "Improving the Deferred Acceptance with Minimal Compromise," Papers 2205.00032, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2023.
• Hidemasa Ishii & Nariaki Nishino, 2022. "Asymptotically stable matchings and evolutionary dynamics of preference revelation games in marriage problems," Papers 2205.08079, arXiv.org.
• Wanchang Zhang, 2022. "Information-Robust Optimal Auctions," Papers 2205.04137, arXiv.org.
• Fupeng Sun & Yanwei Sun & Chiwei Yan & Li Jin, 2022. "Restricting Entries to All-Pay Contests," Papers 2205.08104, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
• Soo Hong Chew & Wenqian Wang, 2022. "Information Design of Dynamic Mechanisms," Papers 2205.10844, arXiv.org.
• Moshe Babaioff & Uriel Feige, 2022. "Fair Shares: Feasibility, Domination and Incentives," Papers 2205.07519, arXiv.org.
• Ritesh Jain and & Michele Lombardi, 2022. "Interim Rationalizable (and Bayes-Nash) Implementation of Functions: A full Characterization," CSEF Working Papers 645, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
• Bugra Caskurlu & Fatih Erdem Kizilkaya, 2022. "On Hedonic Games with Common Ranking Property," Papers 2205.11939, arXiv.org.
• Wu, Haoyang, 2022. "A type-adjustable mechanism where the designer may obtain more payoffs by optimally controlling distributions of agents' types," MPRA Paper 113150, University Library of Munich, Germany.
• B. Ravikumar & Raymond G. Riezman & Yuzhe Zhang, 2022. "Private Information and Optimal Infant Industry Protection," CESifo Working Paper Series 9772, CESifo.