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Collective Learning and Distributive Uncertainty

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  • Ginzburg, Boris

Abstract

I study a committee that is considering a costly project whose distributive consequences are unknown. The committee is divided into two factions. Support of both factions is required for the project to be approved. By delaying approval, the committee can gradually learn which faction benefits from the project. I show that a project that gives a lower payoff to everyone is more likely to be approved than a more socially efficient project. Furthermore, the equilibrium amount of learning is excessive, and a deadline on adopting the project is socially optimal in a wide range of settings.

Suggested Citation

  • Ginzburg, Boris, 2022. "Collective Learning and Distributive Uncertainty," MPRA Paper 112780, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:112780
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Vincent Anesi & Mikhail Safronov, 2021. "Cloturing Deliberation," DEM Discussion Paper Series 21-03, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
    2. Hülya Eraslan & Kirill S. Evdokimov & Jan Zápal, 2022. "Dynamic Legislative Bargaining," Springer Books, in: Emin Karagözoğlu & Kyle B. Hyndman (ed.), Bargaining, chapter 0, pages 151-175, Springer.
    3. Jimmy Chan & Alessandro Lizzeri & Wing Suen & Leeat Yariv, 2018. "Deliberating Collective Decisions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 85(2), pages 929-963.
    4. Bruno Strulovici, 2010. "Learning While Voting: Determinants of Collective Experimentation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(3), pages 933-971, May.
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    6. Steven Callander & Patrick Hummel, 2014. "Preemptive Policy Experimentation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(4), pages 1509-1528, July.
    7. Austen-Smith, David & Dziuda, Wioletta & Harstad, Bård & Loeper, Antoine, 2019. "Gridlock and inefficient policy instruments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4), November.
    8. Freer, Mikhail & Martinelli, César & Wang, Siyu, 2020. "Collective experimentation: A laboratory study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 365-379.
    9. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-1155, December.
    10. Messner, Matthias & Polborn, Mattias K., 2012. "The option to wait in collective decisions and optimal majority rules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(5), pages 524-540.
    11. Ginzburg, Boris & Guerra, José-Alberto, 2019. "When collective ignorance is bliss: Theory and experiment on voting for learning," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 52-64.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nicolás Figueroa & José-Alberto Guerra & Francisco Silva, 2022. "The role of information in collective decisions," Documentos CEDE 20508, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    voting; learning; reform adoption; collective experimentation; distributive uncertainty;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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