Cloturing Deliberation
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Cited by:
- Ginzburg, Boris, 2022. "Collective Learning and Distributive Uncertainty," MPRA Paper 112780, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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More about this item
Keywords
Cloture; deliberation; obstruction; pivots; political failure; stability; voting.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2021-04-12 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DES-2021-04-12 (Economic Design)
- NEP-MIC-2021-04-12 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2021-04-12 (Positive Political Economics)
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