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Outside the Government: Why Ethnic Parties Fail to Join the Post-Communist Cabinets

Author

Listed:
  • Sergiu Gherghina

    (Institute of Political Science, Goethe University Frankfurt)

  • George Jiglău

Abstract

This article seeks to identify the causes impeding the ethnic parties to participate in the post-communist coalition governments. We conduct a cross-national and longitudinal analysis in which we take into account all the elections in which the ethnic parties gained parliamentary representation. With 44 cases over two decades – the party in election is the unit of analysis – and Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) as method of analysis, this study bears theoretical and empirical implications. The key findings illustrate that leadership stability (or rigidity) and the involvement in particular issues of representation can drive the ethnic parties out of government. This combined effect prevails against other factors such as the pivotal role, splits or mergers, electoral strategies (alliances or radical discourses), or incumbency.

Suggested Citation

  • Sergiu Gherghina & George Jiglău, 2013. "Outside the Government: Why Ethnic Parties Fail to Join the Post-Communist Cabinets," Working Papers 335, Leibniz Institut für Ost- und Südosteuropaforschung (Institute for East and Southeast European Studies).
    • Handle: RePEc:ost:wpaper:335
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    ethnic parties; government coalitions; organizational change; post-communism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D79 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Other

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