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Coalition Government Membership in West European Parliamentary Democracies

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  • Warwick, Paul V.

Abstract

The results of a quantitative investigation into the factors affecting coalition government membership in West European parliamentary democracies are reported in this article. Using a new data set covering the post-war era to 1990, separate logistic regression analyses are performed to determine what influences the odds of becoming the government ‘formateur’ and the odds of becoming a coalition partner. In addition, Laver and Shepsle's portfolio allocation theory is subjected to testing. Among the independent variables considered are a party's size, its previous experience in government, its willingness to trade off policy for office, and its ideological position in the parliamentary party system. The findings point to the important roles played by the formateur's preferences and by the need to build workable coalitions, given party-system constraints. They also suggest several criteria that ought to, but often do not, guide formal theory-building.

Suggested Citation

  • Warwick, Paul V., 1996. "Coalition Government Membership in West European Parliamentary Democracies," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 26(4), pages 471-499, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:bjposi:v:26:y:1996:i:04:p:471-499_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Catherine E. De Vries & Sara B. Hobolt, 2012. "When dimensions collide: The electoral success of issue entrepreneurs," European Union Politics, , vol. 13(2), pages 246-268, June.
    2. Hanna Bäck & Patrick Dumont, 2008. "Making the first move," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 353-373, June.
    3. Wissink, Joeri & Beest, Ilja van & Pronk, Tila & Ven, Niels van de, 2022. "Strength is still a weakness in coalition formation : Replicating and understanding the Strength-is-Weakness effect," Other publications TiSEM 224b7385-ffb6-4bad-8b9f-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Sergiu Gherghina & George Jiglău, 2013. "Outside the Government: Why Ethnic Parties Fail to Join the Post-Communist Cabinets," Working Papers 335, Leibniz Institut für Ost- und Südosteuropaforschung (Institute for East and Southeast European Studies).
    5. Michael Laver & Scott Marchi & Hande Mutlu, 2011. "Negotiation in legislatures over government formation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 285-304, June.
    6. Kärnä, Anders & Meriläinen, Jaakko & Norell, John, 2024. "The Price of Exclusion: Coalition Formation in the Shadow of Rising Radical Right," Working Paper Series 1507, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    7. Goodhart, Lucy, 2013. "Who Decides? Coalition Governance and Ministerial Discretion," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 8(3), pages 205-237, June.
    8. Montero, Maria & Vidal-Puga, Juan J., 2007. "Demand Commitment in Legislative Bargaining," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 101(4), pages 847-850, November.
    9. repec:gig:joupla:v:3:y:2011:i:1:p:3-28 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Wissink, Joeri & Cantiani, Anabela & Ven, Niels van de & Pronk, Tila & Erle, Thorsten M. & Beest, Ilja van, 2023. "Strength‐is‐weakness : The (ir)relevant relation between resources and payoffs in coalition formation," Other publications TiSEM 75683c21-0614-49c7-95a1-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    11. Michael Herrmann, 2014. "Polls, coalitions and strategic voting under proportional representation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 26(3), pages 442-467, July.
    12. Nataliya Demyanenko & Pierfrancesco Mura, 2023. "Gamson–Shapley Laws: a formal approach to parliamentary coalition formation," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 10(1), pages 1-10, December.
    13. Diermeier, Daniel & Merlo, Antonio, 2004. "An empirical investigation of coalitional bargaining procedures," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 783-797, March.
    14. Juan M. Benito-Ostolaza & María J. Campión & Asier Estevan, 2021. "A Mathematical Approach to Law and Deal Modelling: Legislation and Agreements," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(10), pages 1-15, May.
    15. Bäck, Hanna & Lindvall, Johannes, 2015. "Commitment Problems in Coalitions: A New Look at the Fiscal Policies Of Multiparty Governments," Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(1), pages 53-72, January.

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