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A century of economics and engineering at Stanford

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  • Cherrier, Beatrice
  • Saïdi, Aurélien

Abstract

This paper document the disciplinary exchanges between economists and engineers at Stanford throughout the 20th century. We also elucidate how this cross-fertlization was mediated by the institutional structure of the university. We outline the role of key scholars such as Kenneth Arrow and Robert Wilson, as well as engineers turned administrators like Frederick Terman. We show that engineers largely drew upon successive economic theories of decision and allocation with a view to improving practical industrial management decisions. Reciprocally, economists found in engineering the tools (from linear programming to optimal control theory) they needed to rethink production and growth theory, an epistemology of “application” that emphasized awareness to institutional details, trials and errors and experiments to improve the design of processes and machines, and all sorts of industrial settings to operationalize their theories of decision, strategic interaction and bargaining. By the 2000s, they had turned into economic engineers designing markets and other allocation mechanisms. These cross-disciplinary exchanges were mediated by Stanford’s own institutional culture, notably its use of joint appointments, the development of multidisciplinary “programs” for students, the ability to attract a variety of visitors every year, the entrepreneurial and contract-oriented vision of its administrators, and the close ties with the industrial milieu that came to be called the Silicon Valley.

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  • Cherrier, Beatrice & Saïdi, Aurélien, 2019. "A century of economics and engineering at Stanford," SocArXiv adtbj, Center for Open Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:adtbj
    DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/adtbj
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    1. Judy L Klein, 2015. "The Cold War Hot House for Modeling Strategies at the Carnegie Institute of Technology," Working Papers Series 19, Institute for New Economic Thinking.
    2. Alvin E. Roth & Robert B. Wilson, 2019. "How Market Design Emerged from Game Theory: A Mutual Interview," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 33(3), pages 118-143, Summer.
    3. Erickson, Paul, 2015. "The World the Game Theorists Made," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226097039.
    4. Kenneth J. Arrow, 1987. "Arrow on Arrow: an Interview," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: George R. Feiwel (ed.), Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy, chapter 23, pages 637-657, Palgrave Macmillan.
    5. William Thomas, 2014. "Decisions and Dynamics: Postwar Theoretical Problems and the MIT Style of Economics," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 46(5), pages 295-314, Supplemen.
    6. Alvin E. Roth, 2002. "The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1341-1378, July.
    7. Erickson, Paul & Klein, Judy L. & Daston, Lorraine & Lemov, Rebecca & Sturm, Thomas & Gordin, Michael D., 2013. "How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226046631.
    8. Matthieu Ballandonne, 2012. "New economics of science, economics of scientific knowledge and sociology of science: the case of Paul David," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(4), pages 391-406, December.
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