IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/osf/socarx/4w9af_v1.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Institutional Foundations of the Power to Persuade

Author

Listed:
  • Prato, Carlo
  • Turner, Ian R

    (Yale University)

Abstract

Formal presidential authority does not always translate into real power over policy. To study the institutional foundations of presidential power over policy, we develop a theory in which the president can shape information available to bureaucratic subordinates via both overt, legitimate channels and covert, illegitimate interventions. We show that the president's ability to persuade bureaucrats to align policy with her own goals requires (i) some bureaucratic independence and (ii) a measure of external oversight of the executive. Both inter-branch relations and intra-branch institutions shape the credibility of presidential directives. The incentives driving aggressive oversight, moreover, depend on the commitment of overseers to their institutional missions, their policy alignment with the president, and the independence of the agency making policy. Our theory provides insights into the dynamics of presidential policy influence, and empirical implications for patterns of oversight under unified versus divided government and the institutional design of bureaucratic agencies.

Suggested Citation

  • Prato, Carlo & Turner, Ian R, 2022. "Institutional Foundations of the Power to Persuade," SocArXiv 4w9af_v1, Center for Open Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:4w9af_v1
    DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/4w9af_v1
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://osf.io/download/62885a8e47df8564b36efd19/
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.31219/osf.io/4w9af_v1?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bawn, Kathleen, 1995. "Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(1), pages 62-73, March.
    2. Li, Christopher M. & Sasso, Greg & Turner, Ian R, 2023. "Managing Government Hierarchy: Electoral Turnover and Intra-Governmental Cooperation," SocArXiv xuvjc, Center for Open Science.
    3. Patty, John & Turner, Ian R, 2024. "Strange Bedfellows: How the Need for Good Governance Shapes Budgetary Control of Bureaucracy," OSF Preprints pnx2u, Center for Open Science.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Michael Makowsky & Thomas Stratmann, 2014. "Politics, unemployment, and the enforcement of immigration law," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(1), pages 131-153, July.
    2. Thomas Braendle & Alois Stutzer, 2013. "Political selection of public servants and parliamentary oversight," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 45-76, February.
    3. Chris Hanretty & Christel Koop, 2013. "Shall the law set them free? The formal and actual independence of regulatory agencies," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 7(2), pages 195-214, June.
    4. Cyril Benoît, 2021. "Politicians, regulators, and regulatory governance: The neglected sides of the story," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(S1), pages 8-22, November.
    5. Pardow Diego G., 2020. "Political Insulation, Technical Expertise and the Technocrat’s Paradox," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(1), pages 1-21, March.
    6. Turner, Ian R, 2021. "Policy Durability, Agency Capacity, and Executive Unilateralism," SocArXiv stnzf, Center for Open Science.
    7. Terrence L. Chapman, 2007. "International Security Institutions, Domestic Politics, and Institutional Legitimacy," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 51(1), pages 134-166, February.
    8. Mattia Guidi, 2015. "The Impact of Independence on Regulatory Outcomes: the Case of EU Competition Policy," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(6), pages 1195-1213, November.
    9. Ian R Turner, 2017. "Working smart and hard? Agency effort, judicial review, and policy precision," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(1), pages 69-96, January.
    10. Abbott, Kenneth W. & Genschel, Philipp & Snidal, Duncan & Zangl, Bernhard, 2018. "The governor's dilemma: Competence versus control in indirect governance," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Global Governance SP IV 2018-101, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    11. Kenneth W. Abbott & Philipp Genschel & Duncan Snidal & Bernhard Zangl, 2020. "Competence versus control: The governor's dilemma," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 14(4), pages 619-636, October.
    12. Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati, 2009. "Does Timing og Elections Instigate Riots? A Subnational Study of 16 Indian States, 1958-2004," Working Papers id:1835, eSocialSciences.
    13. Min-Seok Pang, 2017. "Politics and Information Technology Investments in the U.S. Federal Government in 2003–2016," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 28(1), pages 33-45, March.
    14. Sanders James & Lisi Giulio & Schonhardt-Bailey Cheryl, 2017. "Themes and Topics in Parliamentary Oversight Hearings: A New Direction in Textual Data Analysis," Statistics, Politics and Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 8(2), pages 153-194, December.
    15. Neal D. Woods, 2018. "Regulatory Analysis Procedures and Political Influence on Bureaucratic Policymaking," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 12(2), pages 299-313, June.
    16. Wibbenmeyer, Matthew & Anderson, Sarah & Plantinga, Andrew J., 2020. "Inequality in Agency Responsiveness: Evidence from Salient Wildfire Events," RFF Working Paper Series 20-22, Resources for the Future.
    17. Grajzl Peter & Dimitrova-Grajzl Valentina, 2009. "The Choice in the Lawmaking Process: Legal Transplants vs. Indigenous Law," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 615-660, November.
    18. Woojeong Jang & Abraham L. Newman, 2022. "Enforcing European Privacy Regulations from Below: Transnational Fire Alarms and the General Data Protection Regulation," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(2), pages 283-300, March.
    19. Turner, Ian R, 2021. "Policy Durability, Agency Capacity, and Executive Unilateralism," SocArXiv stnzf_v1, Center for Open Science.
    20. Turner, Ian R, 2021. "Reviewing Procedure vs. Judging Substance: How Increasing Bureaucratic Oversight Can Reduce Bureaucratic Accountability," SocArXiv v6kzw, Center for Open Science.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:4w9af_v1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: OSF (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://arabixiv.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.