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Managing Government Hierarchy: Electoral Turnover and Intra-Governmental Cooperation

Author

Listed:
  • Li, Christopher M.
  • Sasso, Greg

    (Bocconi University)

  • Turner, Ian R

    (Yale University)

Abstract

Theories of political accountability often consider voter-politician interactions in isolation from politician-bureaucrat interactions. We study a model of electoral accountability with a governing hierarchy: voter-politician-bureaucrat. The politician and bureaucrat both produce government output valued by the voter. The voter controls the politician via election and the politician provides incentives to bureaucrats. We show that when times are conducive to high quality governance---budgets are large and players are farsighted---incorporating the politician-bureaucrat relationship leads to weaker accountability standards. However, when times are tough and budgets are small or players are myopic voters may benefit from adopting more demanding standards.

Suggested Citation

  • Li, Christopher M. & Sasso, Greg & Turner, Ian R, 2023. "Managing Government Hierarchy: Electoral Turnover and Intra-Governmental Cooperation," SocArXiv xuvjc, Center for Open Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:xuvjc
    DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/xuvjc
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bawn, Kathleen, 1995. "Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(1), pages 62-73, March.
    2. Ian R Turner, 2019. "Political Agency, Oversight, and Bias: The Instrumental Value of Politicized Policymaking," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 35(3), pages 544-578.
    3. Dilip Mookherjee, 2006. "Decentralization, Hierarchies, and Incentives: A Mechanism Design Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 367-390, June.
    4. Ian R. Turner, 2022. "Reviewing Procedure versus Judging Substance: How Increasing Bureaucratic Oversight Can Reduce Bureaucratic Accountability," Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy, now publishers, vol. 2(4), pages 569-596, February.
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