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On the Design of Criminal Trials: The Benefits of a Three-Verdict System

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  • Ron Siegel
  • Bruno Strulovici

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Ron Siegel & Bruno Strulovici, 2015. "On the Design of Criminal Trials: The Benefits of a Three-Verdict System," Discussion Papers 1581, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1581
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    File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1581.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John K.-H. Quah & Bruno Strulovici, 2013. "Discounting, Values, and Decisions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 121(5), pages 896-939.
    2. Lott, John Jr., 1990. "The effect of conviction on the legitimate income of criminals," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 381-385, December.
    3. Grogger, Jeff, 1992. "Arrests, Persistent Youth Joblessness, and Black/White Employment Differentials," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 74(1), pages 100-106, February.
    4. Grossman, Gene M & Katz, Michael L, 1983. "Plea Bargaining and Social Welfare," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 749-757, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Lundberg, Alexander, 2016. "Sentencing discretion and burdens of proof," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 34-42.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Trials; Verdict; Reasonable Doubt; Stigma; Evidence; Plea bargaining shocks; risk aversion. JEL Classification: D02; D7; D81; D82; D83; K1; K4;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • K1 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law
    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior

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